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A B 5 T R AC T. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and its state equivalents have proven a reg-
ulatory failure, as their minimum wage and overtime protections are widely violated with impu-
nity. This Note attributes that failure partly to the overlooked issue of private injunctive relief.
FLSA and most state laws reserve injunctive relief for agency actions -a remedial limitation that
reflects New Deal regulatory attitudes presuming agency-centered enforcement, from which Title
VII and other statutes have since diverged. Public enforcement is clearly insufficient to address the
epidemic in wage and hour violations, and FLSA's private enforcement regime of retrospective
damages actions effectively treats wage theft as a matter of individualized malice. Yet, as Congress
understood at FLSA's passage, wage theft is more often a business model chosen by employers
competing in a given market; minimum wage standards, then, are either secured or undermined
collectively. This Note argues from policy and litigation perspectives that private injunctive relief
would better address the systemic problem of wage theft than damages actions alone, and would
help ensure that FLSA's protections in fact serve as the baseline standards that Congress envi-
sioned.
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INTRODUCTION
When a federal court finds that an employer has engaged in employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII, the standard remedy is to award damages
such as back pay, order immediate equitable relief such as reinstatement or pro-
motion, and enjoin the employer's unlawful practice prospectively -frequently
as applied to all employees, even in the absence of a class action.' For example,
assume a plaintiff challenges an employer's use of a placement test, and a court
holds the test has a disparate impact on Black applicants that cannot be justified
by business necessity. Rather than merely preventing the employer from apply-
ing the discriminatory test to that particular plaintiff, as well as providing any
damages or immediate equitable relief, the court will issue an injunction pre-
venting the employer from using the unlawful test at all.
Not so when it comes to employers stealing wages. When workers show that
an employer has violated the minimum wage or overtime provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA),2 courts will award damages (including liquidated
damages),' and, for claims of employer retaliation, will provide immediate eq-
uitable relief such as reinstatement or front pay.4 Courts will not, absent the ad-
dition of such a term in a settlement agreement, prospectively enjoin an em-
ployer's practice of paying workers less than minimum wage, withholding
overtime pay, making illegal deductions, or committing other forms of "wage
theft." Instead, plaintiffs or other workers who are subject to continued wage
theft from the same employer must file new claims -perhaps attempting to re-
late these claims to the earlier action- and run through the lengthy motions of
civil litigation again.
This feature of FLSA enforcement is not due to a lack of injunctive relief un-
der the Act, as § 217, titled "Injunction proceedings," explicitly provides federal
courts with equitable jurisdiction to "restrain violations" of FLSA's main provi-
sions.' Rather, the statute reserves this remedy for agency enforcement by stat-
ing in § 211 that "the Administrator shall bring all actions under section 217."6
1. See, e.g., Evans v. Harnett Cry. Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 304, 305-06 (4 th Cir. 1982); Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201-02 (7 th Cir. 1971); see also 45C AM. JUR. 2D Job
Discrimination § 2532 (2017) (" [P]ermanent injunctive relief can be entered on a class-wide
basis in a nonclass action and need not be limited to the persons who brought suit.").
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (2012).
3. Id. § 216(b).
4. Id. (providing "legal or equitable relief" for violation of anti-retaliation provision in 29 U.S.C.
§ I.5 21(a)).
s. Id. 5217.
6. Id. 5211 (a).
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Courts have ordered broad injunctions requiring employers, on pain of con-
tempt, to conform to FLSA's provisions.7 However, they have consistently held
that injunctive relief is only available in actions brought by the Department of
Labor (DOL)," and not in the vast majority of FLSA cases, which are brought by
private parties.' As Judge Easterbrook has observed, by limiting injunctive relief
to actions brought by the Secretary of Labor, " [t] he statute leaves the heavy ar-
tillery to public officials."o
The absence of private injunctive relief is not the only remedial inadequacy
that has prevented FLSA from effectively combatting wage theft on a systematic
level; the statute also lacks an opt-out class mechanism. That combination has
produced a hobbled private enforcement regime" as compared to other federal
employment laws like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 12 Opt-out class actions, such as under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allow one or more named plain-
tiffs to bring an action on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, where
7. See, e.g., McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949); Donovan v. Sureway Clean-
ers, 656 F.2d 1368 ( 9 th Cit. 1981); Wirtz v. Ocala Gas Co., 336 F.2d 236 (5th Cit. 1964).
8. See, e.g., Powell v. Wash. Post Co., 267 F.2d 651, 652 (D.C. Cit. 1959); Roberg v. Henry Phipps
Estate, 156 F.2d 958, 963 (2d Cit. 1946); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978)
(noting agreement among lower courts).
9. According to the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system, there were
8,954 FLSA cases filed in 2015, 130 of which were by DOL. See Doug Hass, FLSA Minimum
Wage, Overtime Lawsuits Set New Record in 2015, Filing Growth Continues, DAY SHIFT (Jan. 4,
2016), http://dayshift.com/2o16/ol/o4/flsa-minimum-wage-overtime-lawsuits-set-new
-record-in-2015-filing-growth-continues/1352 [http://perma.cc/QG7X-YCJ5]. Note hat
these figures do not indicate relative levels of private and public FLSA enforcement generally,
given that agency enforcement may not result in a lawsuit -for example, where an employer
agrees to settle after an investigation.
10. Heitmann v. City of Chicago, 56o F.3d 642, 644 (7 th Cit. 2009).
11. Sean Farhang defines "private enforcement regime" as a statute's set of rules for "who has
standing to sue, which parties will bear the costs of litigation, what damages will be available
to winning plaintiffs, whether a judge or jury will make factual determinations and assess
damages, and rules of liability, evidence, and proof." SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE:
PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 3 (2010). Farhang writes,
" [T]ogether [these] can have profound consequences for how much or little private enforce-
ment litigation will actually be mobilized." Id. at 3-4 (2010). Note that in terms of remedies,
Farhang's definition focuses on damages and fee-shifting and does not mention whether and
what type of injunctive relief is available.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5(g)(1) (2012) (providing that a court upon a finding of discrimination
under Title VII "may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,' including "any other equi-
table relief as the court deems appropriate"); Pons, 434 U.S. at 581 (discussing the availability
of private injunctive relief under the ADEA).
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joinder of all such individuals is impracticable and certain other criteria are
met." Where a class action is properly maintained, individuals within that class
are covered by any judgment or settlement unless they affirmatively "opt out" of
the litigation.1 This device thus allows plaintiffs to extend the remedy in a suc-
cessful case to the entire class of affected individuals, and it allows defendants
the benefits of claim preclusion on the same broad scale. By contrast, FLSA's
"collective action" provision, which essentially serves to facilitate notice to po-
tential plaintiffs and joinder, requires employees to affirmatively "opt in" to an
action by name in order to be covered." Whereas an opt-out class mechanism
allows a handful of named plaintiffs to aggregate and represent the interests of
thousands or even millions of individuals who do not directly participate in the
litigation, FLSA's inefficient "collective action" provision requires that organizers
and attorneys contact each worker to be covered, and, in the face of a significant
possibility of employer retaliation, convince those workers to put their names to
a complaint at a point in the case when recovery is uncertain. Moreover, because
opt-in actions neither provide relief to nor bind the entire class of affected indi-
viduals, they fail to definitively resolve legal issues for both plaintiffs and defend-
ants. For instance, while multiple Rule 23 actions cannot be maintained for the
same claims on behalf of the same class of individuals, FLSA's opt-in mechanism
may and sometimes does result in the maintenance of multiple overlapping col-
lective actions with different groups of opt-in plaintiffs, none of which resolves
the issue on behalf of all affected workers.16 Opt-in collective actions therefore
present an inefficient and logistically difficult means of aggregating claims as
compared to opt-out class actions.
Not all states that enacted parallel wage and hour laws wholly replicated the
FLSA private-enforcement model. Some state laws provide opt-out class mech-
13. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
14. Id. 23(C)(2)(B)(v).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) ("No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless
he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the
court. . . ."); see also Scott A. Moss &Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts
Thwart Wage Rights by Misapplying ClassAction Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523 (2012) (discussing
this provision).
16. See, e.g., Kampfer v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 3:14 cV 2849, 2016 WL 1110257, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
Mar. 22, 2016) (noting that "[t]he language of Section 216(b) does not expressly prohibit a
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anisms, though this limited patchwork does not reach all American workers cov-
ered by FLSA." Similarly, while most state wage and hour laws either do not
provide injunctive relief or, like FLSA, reserve such relief for agency actions,
seven states allow private wage and hour injunctions: Arkansas, Florida, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Utah." The record of
available opinions, however, suggests that advocates do not actively pursue em-
ployer-wide prospective injunctions or enforce injunctions through contempt.
That is, advocates do not appear to wield wage and hour cases as one might an
employment discrimination case, aimed at changing an employer's policies and
ensuring prospective compliance.
In a world where wage theft is endemic in certain industries9 and often
makes economic sense for employers given the low likelihood of enforcement,
employers frequently maintain illegal practices following "successful" enforce-
ment actions. Instead of forcing employers to restructure business models built
on illegally underpaying workers, workers are often forced to play an ongoing,
retrospective game of whack-a-mole.2 0 Meanwhile, workers lose an estimated
17. See Nantiya Ruan, Same Law, Different Day: A Survey of the Last Thirty Years of Wage Litigation
and Its Impact on Low-Wage Workers, 3o HOESTRALAB. &EMP. L.J. 355, 376-77 (2013) (discuss-
ing state opt-out class actions).
is. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 24(e); AR. CODE ANN. § 11-4-218(e)(1) (2017); FIA. STAT.
§ 448.11o(6) (c) (2) (2017); MAss. GEN. LAws ch.149, § 150 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 181.171, sub-
div. 1 (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4 -26(f) (2017); 28 R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-14-19.2(a) (2017);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-40-205(2)(a) (West 2017); see generally 1-2 WAGE AND HOUR LAws: A
STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Gregory K. McGillivary ed., 3d ed. 2016).
ig. See, e.g., Annette Bernhardt et al., Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers: Violations of Employment
and Labor Laws in America's Cities, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT 4 (2009), http://www.nelp.org
/content/uploads/2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2oo9.pdf [http://perma.cc/TWT7-P7UU]
(finding over forty percent noncompliance with the minimum wage in apparel and textile
manufacturing, personal and repair services, and private household work).
20. See Nicole Hallett, The Problem of Wage Theft 14-16 (Sept. 29, 2017) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author) (explaining how employers often continue to violate the law after
paying a settlement or court judgment, in light of the economic benefits, and illustrating this
point with two relatively high-profile cases in New York and Connecticut). As the Govern-
ment Accountability Office explained in a 1981 report, more than a third of employers found
in violation of FLSA were repeat offenders: "Our review showed that many employers repeat-
edly violated the same sections of the act . . .. We believe that many employers are willing to
commit repeated violations of the wage and hour laws because chances of discovery are slim,
penalties are unlikely, and the rewards of illegally withholding employee back wages can be
great.'" Comptroller Gen., Report to the Congress: Changes Needed To Deter Violations ofFair La-
bor Standards Act, GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. 23 (May28, 1981), http://www.gao.gov/assets
/14o/133362.pdf [http://perma.cc/3U4S-Z3C4]. Indeed, the idea for this Note emerged from
a law school clinic case against an employer whom DOL repeatedly found violated state and
federal wage and hour laws, yet who continued to do so systematically.
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$15 billion annually in minimum wage violations2 1 -an enormous, regressive,
and illegal wealth transfer to employers, disproportionately taken from low-
wage workers, immigrants, people of color, and women.22 This is no petty theft
for the injured workers. Victims typically lose a substantial portion of their al-
ready-low incomes, sometimes enough to push them below the federal poverty
line: one study found that the average year-round worker who is a victim of wage
theft loses $3,300 per year, resulting in an annual income of just $10,500.23
Moreover, wage theft harms society at large by increasing workers' dependency
on public assistance programs, in effect subsidizing employers who violate the
law;24 reducing payroll and tax revenues;25 decreasing workers' spending
power;2 6 and exerting downward pressure on wages.27
FLSA enforcement has thus proven a "regulatory failure,"2 8 in which the
wage standards that Congress intended to provide universal protection for work-
21. David Cooper & Teresa Kroeger, Employers Steal Billions from Workers' Paychecks Each Year,
ECON. POL'Y INST. 9 (May 10, 2017), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/125116.pdf [http://
perma.cc/TP88-C3AE].
22. Bernhardt et al., supra note 19, at 42 (reporting that 32.8% of Latino workers were subject to
wage violations, as were 19.1% of Black workers and 15.1% of Asian and other nonwhite work-
ers, compared to 7.8% of white workers; 30.2% of female workers were subject to wage viola-
tions, compared to 19.5% of male workers; and 37.1% of undocumented workers were subject
to wage violations, compared to 21.3% of documented foreign-born workers).
23. Cooper & Kroeger, supra note 21, at 2; see also id. at 14 (finding that eliminating wage theft
would reduce the poverty rate among minimum-wage arners who are victims of wage theft
from 21.4% to 14.8%).
24. Id. at 14 (finding that one in three workers experiencing wage theft is on some form of public
assistance, and that 18% of workers experiencing wage theft receive food stamps); cf. Ken
Jacobs, Ian Perry & Jennifer MacGillvary, The High Public Cost of Low Wages, U.C. BERKELEY
LAB. CTR. (Apr. 2015), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2015/the-high-public-cost-of
-low-wages.pdf [http://perma.cc/YF7H-DDGP] (finding that U.S. taxpayers spend $152.8
billion each year in public support for working families because their wages are not sufficient
to support basic living costs).
25. Just Pay: Improving Wage and Hour Enforcement at the United States Department of
Labor, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT 7 (2010), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03
/JustPayReport2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/2TY2-TBTK].
26. Id.
27. Josh Bivens et al., RaisingAmerica's Pay: Why It's Our Central Economic Policy Challenge, ECON.
POL'Y INST. 8, 65 (June 4, 2014), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/65287.pdf [http://perma
.cc/ 7YRB-P55N]; Cooper & Kroeger, supra note 21, at 2, 30.
28. See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53
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ers and an even baseline for employer competition are "regularly and systemati-
cally violated."2 9 In a survey of low-wage workers in Chicago, Los Angeles, and
New York City, the National Employment Law Project (NELP) found that
twenty-six percent of workers were paid less than minimum wage in the previ-
ous week and that seventy-six percent of employees were not paid their legally
required overtime, resulting in an estimated $2,634 loss annually per worker.so
A vast literature has documented similar violations." Wage theft is especially
acute among women, people of color, and immigrants (particularly those who
are undocumented), who most lack the resources and job security necessary to
report violations or bring private actions.32
Neither DOL's Wage and Hour Division (WHD), which is tasked with en-
forcing FLSA, nor its state equivalents (where they exist) have proven sufficient
to address this gargantuan problem, despite significant reforms under the Clin-
ton and Obama Administrations." Agency resources are sorely lacking and sub-
ject to political caprice: while the number of workers covered by wage and hour
laws grew fifty-five percent from 1975 to 2004, the number of WHD investiga-
tors decreased by more than fourteen percent, from 921 to 788.34 Unsurprisingly,
the number of workers awarded back wages declined by twenty-four percent
during this period." Moreover, while WHD hired over three hundred new in-
29. Bernhardt et al., supra note 19, at 2.
30. Id. at 2, 5.
31. See, e.g., Winning Wage Justice: A Summary of Research on Wage and Hour Violations in the
United States, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT (July 2013), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads
/2015/03/WinningWageJusticeSummaryofResearchonWageTheft.pdf [http://perma.cc
/44H2-WFKG].
32. See Llezlie Green Coleman, Exploited at the Intersection: A Critical Race Feminist Analysis of Un-
documented Latina Workers and the Role of the PrivateAttorney General, 22 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L.
397, 403-05 (2015).
33. For a report and series of enforcement recommendations that David Weil authored shortly
before becoming WHD Administrator in 2014, see David Weil, Improving Workplace Condi-
tions Through Strategic Enforcement: A Report to the Wage and Hour Division 1, 5 (May 2010),
http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z4LD
-2CVJ].
34. Annette Bernhardt & SiobhAn McGrath, Trends in Wage and Hour Enforcement by the U.S. De-
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vestigators under the Obama Administration, these officials are still able to in-
vestigate only a small fraction of employers covered by FLSA.3 6 A series of re-
ports by the Government Accountability Office revealed that DOL "frequently
responded inadequately to complaints," sometimes lied to ostensible complain-
ants, and closed cases "based on unverified information provided by the em-
ployer."" Even if workers are awarded damages, they may see little to no recov-
ery: one study found that only seventeen percent of workers who prevailed at
the California wage and hour agency from 2008 to 2011 collected any money."
In short, there is an enforcement crisis in wage and hour law, and agency actions
are clearly insufficient to solve that crisis.
This Note proposes, as a matter of effective regulation and advancing work-
ers' rights, that injunctive relief be made generally available in private wage theft
actions and aggressively pursued in states where it exists. Such relief could be
achieved by amending FLSA to strike the language in § 211 that limits injunctive
relief to agency actions, or-perhaps more feasibly, but with lesser impact-by
adding provisions for private injunctive relief to state wage and hour laws." As
I demonstrate, the FLSA enforcement regime is a residue of New Deal regulatory
attitudes, which presumed a powerful agency as the primary enforcement vehi-
cle and an economy with high union density, where most workers would have
recourse in the first instance to a system of collective bargaining to set workplace
standards and resolve disputes. Yet today, DOL actions constitute a small frac-
tion of wage theft actions,40 and union density has declined precipitously from a
height of 30-35% in the mid-1940s and 1950s4 1 to 10.7% in 2016 -including as
36. See Elizabeth J. Kennedy, Wage Theft as Public Larceny, 81 BROOK. L. REv. 517, 534-36 (2016).
37. Highlights: Wage and Hour Division's Complaint Intake and Investigative Processes Leave Low
Wage Workers Vulnerable to Wage Theft, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. 1 (2009), http://
www.gao.gov/assets/130/122112.pdf [http://perma.cc/2SJ9-43471.
38. Eunice Hyunhye Cho et al., Hollow Victories: The Crisis in Collecting Unpaid Wages for Califor-
nia's Workers, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT 2 (2013), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2o15
/o2/Hollow-Victories.pdf [http://perma.cc/AQ4V-3ZLR]; see also Cmty. Dev. Project at the
Urban Justice Ctr. et al., Empty Judgments: The Wage Collection Crisis in New York, NAT'L
CTR. FOR L. & ECON. JUST. 5 (2015), http://nclej.org/wp-content/uploads/215/11/Empty
-Judgments-The-Wage-Collection-Crisis-in-New-York.pdf [http://perma.cc/9CV3-AESD]
(identifying $125 million in unpaid judgments and orders in New York).
39. Explicit amendment might not be necessary in some states where injunctive relief is impliedly
available based on legislative history or remedial provisions from other areas of law, though
such an argument is beyond the scope of this Note.
40. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
41. Richard B. Freeman, Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes, in THE
DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY 265, 292 tbl.SA.2 (Michael D. Bordo et al. eds., 1998).
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low as 1.6% in one state.42 The decline in union density means that an increasing
proportion of American workers rely on employment law, rather than collective
bargaining, to provide basic workplace protections.43 This strains agency re-
sources further, as FLSA is forced to play an outsized role in the workplace reg-
ulatory landscape. In light of this regulatory failure, making wage and hour pro-
tections real for most workers requires democratizing all the weapons in FLSA's
arsenal, including injunctive relief.
Scholars and practitioners have proposed several reforms aimed at address-
ing America's wage theft crisis. Many have called for increased penalties, uch as
mandatory treble damages, to shift the calculus whereby employers conclude
that it pays to underpay workers.44 Others have suggested pressing state and lo-
cal law enforcement o bring criminal charges against employers, harnessing the
stigma and force of criminal sanctions to induce compliance.4 5 Some have
stressed the need for better protections for immigrant workers, such as increased
U-visa certifications for workplace-related crimes or greater protections against
immigration-related retaliation.4 6 Still others have proposed DOL reforms, such
42. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members-2o16, U.S. DEP'T LAB. 1 (Jan. 26, 2017),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [http://perma.cc/P5Q2-XB4A].
43. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 319, 321 (2005) ("Since the 196os, the New Deal collective bargaining system
has been supplemented, and largely supplanted, by ... a regulatory model of minimum
standards enforceable mainly by administrative agencies and a rights model of judicially en-
forceable individual rights."); Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2685, 2687-92 (20o8) (describing the "hydraulic process" whereby workers have used
employment law to serve labor law purposes, and employment law's limitations in that role).
44. See, e.g., Matthew Fritz-Mauer, Lofty Laws, Broken Promises: Wage Theft and the Degradation of
Low-Wage Workers, 2o EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 71, 117 (2016); Lauren K. Dasse, Note, Wage
Theft in New York: The Wage Theft Prevention Act as a Counter to an Endemic Problem, 16 CUNY
L. REV. 97, 114 (2012); Winning Wage Justice: An Advocate's Guide to State and City Policies To
Fight Wage Theft, NAT'L EMP. L PROJECT 19-20 (Jan. 2011), http://www.nelp.org/content
/uploads/2015/03/WinningWageJustice2oll.pdf [http://perma.cc/4ZBG-3ZLL] (identify-
ing mandatory treble damages as a "NELP Top Pick" among several possible wage and hour
reforms).
45. See, e.g., Stephen Lee, Policing Wage Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 655
(2014); Rita J. Verga, An Advocate's Toolkit: Using Criminal "Theft of Service" Laws To Enforce
Workers' Right To Be Paid, 8 CUNY L. REv. 283 (2005).
46. Lee, supra note 45; see also Eunice Hyunhye Cho et al., A New Understanding of Substantial
Abuse: Evaluating Harm in U-Visa Petitions for Immigrant Victims of Workplace Crime, 29 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2014) (describing the heightened difficulty of securing certification for U-visa
applications involving workplace-related crimes).
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as the 1990s resurrection of FLSA's "hot goods" provision47 used to enjoin the
sale of goods produced in violation of FLSA and strategic targeting of employers
higher up the supply chain.48
Many commentators have identified the importance of aggregating claims to
achieve systemic employer reform, particularly since the Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947 removed FLSA opt-out class actions and "representative actions" by unions
and other organizations.4 9 At least two commentators have called for a private
right of action for FLSA's "hot goods" provision,so which would be a potent-if
likely controversial" -tool for workers to halt supply chains built upon wage
violations. Still others have suggested improving collection mechanisms, such as
pre- and post-judgment liens;52 making it easier for workers to collect from the
top shareholders of certain corporations;" and expanding definitions of "em-
ployees" and "employers" to cover excluded workers and adapt to the contem-
porary workplace.5 4 Besides strictly legal solutions, the growth of the "workers
center" movement in the past few decades has seen an explosion in innovative
organizing strategies, which combine workplace organizing with consumer boy-
cotts, publicity campaigns, litigation, and state and local political advocacy."
47. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (1) (2012) (declaring it "unlawful for any person ... to transport, offer for
transportation, ship, deliver, or sell in commerce ... any goods" produced in violation of
FLSA's minimum wage and overtime provisions).
48. See, e.g., David Weil, Crafting a Progressive Regulatory Policy: Why Enforcement Matters, 28
COMP. LAB. L. & PoL'YJ. 101, 138,141-42 (2007); Weil, supra note 33.
49. See, e.g., Moss & Ruan, supra note 15, at 561; Howard Wial, Minimum-Wage Enforcement and
the Low-Wage Labor Market 30 (Task Force on Reconstructing Am.'s Labor Mkt. Insts., Work-
ing Paper No. WP11, 1999), http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2267/b7484ec851ao91893
o3ce63b9acec45f87a4.pdf [http://perma.cc/4R2C-Y22E].
5o. Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening
Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2208 (1994); Wial, supra note 49, at 27.
51. DOL's increased use of the hot goods injunction has been met with significant opposition
from employers, particularly when applied to perishable agricultural goods. See Stephanie A.
Koltookian, Note, Some (Don't) Like It Hot: The Use of the "Hot Goods" Injunction in Perishable
Agriculture, loo IOWAL. REv. 1841 (2015).
52. See KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS ARE NOT
GETTING PAID -AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 152-53 (2009); Cho et al., supra note 38, at
16-18.
53. Cmty. Dev. Project at the Urban Justice Ctr. et al., supra note 38, at 24-25.
54. Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Re-
discovering the Statutory Definition ofEmployment, 46 UCLAL. REV. 983 (1999).
55. See, e.g., JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE
DREAM (20o6); Andrew Friedman & Deborah Axt, In Defense of Dignity, 45 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 577 (2010).
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Each of these contributions has highlighted important facets of Americas
wage theft problem, and many have led to municipal and state reforms that have
improved the lives of workers and their communities. Yet these reforms have
largely failed to make a dent in the fundamental fact of widespread wage theft:
a study of states that have passed wage theft laws in the past ten years found that
only mandatory treble damages produced a statistically significant -albeit still
minor- decline in violations.56 Further, all of these proposals have overlooked
the issue of prospective injunctive relief under FLSA's main provisions," failing
to note how FLSA's remedial structure differs from other employment and civil
rights statutes by reserving this relief for agency actions. Few even acknowledge
DOL's use of such injunctions, though they were once a prominent feature of
enforcement and continue to be used frequently. Indeed, the only scholarship to
directly address § 217 injunctions, apart from those related to "hot goods," ap-
pears to be a student Note and a Comment, both from the late 1940s." This
Note fills that gap by exploring how injunctive relief functions in DOL actions
and might be similarly used by private litigants. It proposes private injunctive
relief as one tool among many: private injunctive relief is no panacea for wage
theft, but it may prove effective in certain circumstances at securing employer
compliance, and its availability may shift bargaining power to workers generally.
In addition to providing relief in particular cases, democratizing the FLSA
injunction helps conceive of wage theft as a fundamentally systemic problem
that - like Title VII - requires restructuring employer practices. Congress under-
stood the systemic nature of wage standards at FLSA's passage, declaring that
substandard labor conditions "constitute [] an unfair method of competition"
and that commerce in goods that are unfairly produced "spread[s] and perpetu-
ate [s] such labor conditions."9 Yet the dominant understanding of wage theft
among scholars and advocates, like FLSA's private enforcement regime, treats
wage and hour violations as a problem of individual bad actors. This failure to
appreciate the systemic character of wage theft appears to be due in part to the
56. Daniel J. Galvin, Deterring Wage Theft: Alt-Labor, State Politics, and the Policy Determinants of
Minimum Wage Compliance, 14 PERSP. ON POL. 324, 339-41 (2016).
57. This Note uses "prospective injunction" or "prospective injunctive relief" to refer to injunc-
tions prohibiting employers from future violations of wage and hour law. By contrast, injunc-
tive relief may address past violations, such as by reinstating workers who were retaliated
against by employers, or by enjoining the sale of "hot goods" produced in violation of FLSA.
See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
58. E. Merrick Dodd, Comment, The Supreme Court and FairLabor Standards, 1941-1945,59 HARV.
L. REv. 321 (1946); Note, The Statutory Injunction as an Enforcement Weapon ofFederal Agencies,
57 YALE L.J. 1023 (1948).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012).
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dyadic nature of litigation and advocacy campaigns against a given employer, as
well as the benefits of emphasizing the individual moral culpability of a targeted
employer. Once wage theft is understood not as an act of personal malice but as
a business model,60 widespread to the extent that it appears necessary to compete
in certain industries, the idea of attacking it with individual damages claims ap-
pears fundamentally wrongheaded.61 By contrast, private injunctions invoke the
equitable power of courts; they elevate wage theft from a regulatory infraction
to what Llezlie Green Coleman rightly identifies as a civil rights issue,62 given its
disproportionate impact on marginalized groups. In challenging the view of em-
ployment law as about and secured by individuals, this Note also joins scholar-
ship seeking to unsettle the line between employment and labor law.63
The Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I situates the FLSA enforcement regime
amid both broader attitudes toward regulatory enforcement at i s enactment and
the movement toward private enforcement in subsequent decades. This Part
draws on a growing body of remedies literature investigating why Congress has
enacted mixed public-private enforcement regimes, and the relative efficacy of
those regimes.64 While much of this literature has analyzed Title VII and other
So. One might then ask why we should retain the moralizing language of "wage theft," rather
than something like "wage and hour noncompliance." Understanding that structural forces
encourage wage theft does not prevent us from condemning its effects and the structures of
social domination in which it exists, as well as the abuse and intimidation that typically ac-
company wage theft. Moreover, "wage theft" has proven a resonant political frame that casts
wealth transfers from regulatory violations in a familiar context of stealing and injustice. See
generally BoBo, supra note 52 (framing wage theft in terms of faith-based notions of justice).
61. This Note is not the first to urge such a framing. As early as 1979, economists Orley Ash-
enfelter and Robert Smith theorized that employers engage in wage theft based on a cost-
benefit analysis that weighs the likelihood of detection and the associated penalties against
the expected profits of violating the law. Orley Ashenfelter & Robert S. Smith, Compliance
with the Minimum Wage Law, 87J. PoL. ECON. 333 (1979). Nicole Hallett has recently argued
for engaging with the economics literature and foregrounding the employer's cost-benefit
analysis when developing and measuring solutions to the current wage theft crisis. Hallett,
supra note 20.
62. Coleman, supra note 32, at 417 (referring to "civil rights statutes, including the Fair Labor
Standards Act").
63. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2 (2016); Estlund, supra note 43;
Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division ofAmerican Work Law, 28 BERKELEY
J. EMP. &LAB. L. 163 (2007); Sachs, supra note 43; see infra Part IV.
64. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013);
Sean Farhang, Regulation, Litigation, and Reform, in THE POLITICS OF MAJOR POLICY REFORM
IN POSTWAR AMERICA 48-76 (Jeffery A. Jenkins & Sidney M. Milkis eds., 2014); R. Shep
Melnick, Courts and Agencies in the American Civil Rights State, in THE POLITICS OF MAJORPOL-
ICY REFORM IN POSTWAR AMERICA 77-102 (Jeffery A. Jenkins & Sidney M. Milkis eds., 2014);
Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between
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statutes from the 196os and 1970s, no articles have explored the history and de-
sign of FLSA. This history suggests that FLSA's emphasis on agency enforce-
ment is a vestige of New Deal-era regulatory attitudes from which Congress has
since departed, and which is further inappropriate given the outsized role that
FLSA and other employment law has been forced to play in the contemporary,
largely non-union American workplace.
Part II engages with contemporary private enforcement literature to make
the regulatory case for the private wage and hour injunctions. This Part argues
that private injunctions would promote more aggressive and consistent enforce-
ment across presidential administrations, harness the informational advantages
of workers, and better serve the goal of worker empowerment han agency ac-
tions. Part II also responds to policy concerns about private enforcement, includ-
ing a perceived lack of democratic accountability, the potential to overburden
regulated parties (here, employers), and the dangers of abusive enforcers who
push meritless claims.
Part III draws on DOL's record of § 217 enforcement to assess the litigation
benefits and disadvantages of injunctive relief, and to envision what such relief
might look like in a private action. This aspect of DOL's practice has received
almost no discussion from commentators or from the Agency itself, despite the
impression from courts and Congress that it is "of cardinal importance to the
vitality of the Fair Labor Standards Act" 65 and is the tool ultimately responsible
for changing an employer's practices.66 Together, the regulatory and litigation
benefitS6 7 of private wage and hour injunctions counsel in favor of extending
such relief under FLSA and in state laws where not presently available, and more
aggressively pursuing this relief in states where it exists.
Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 1ob-5, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1301 (2008); George Ruther-
glen, Private Rights and PrivateActions: The Legacy of Civil Rights in the Enforcement of Title VII,
95 B.U. L. REv. 733 (2015); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The
Case ofHousingand Employment, 45 UCLAL. REV. 1401 (1998); Matthew C. Stephenson, Pub-
lic Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role ofAdministrative Agencies,
91 VA. L. REV. 93 (2005).
65. Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1965); see also Heitmann v. City of Chicago, 560
F.3d 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2009) (describing § 217 injunctions as FLSA's "heavy artillery"); Metz-
ler v. INBP, Inc., 127 F.3d 959, 963 (loth Cir. 1997) ("Prospective injunctions are an essential
tool to effectuate the policy of the FLSA. . . .").
66. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1977: Hearings on S. 1871 Before the S. Subcomm. on Labor,
9 5th Cong. 16-17 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 FLSA Hearings] (describing an injunction under
§ 217, in contrast with damages, as the means for "getting the rate [of pay] changed").
67. While there is not a neat division between these two benefits, this Note uses "regulatory ben-
efits and disadvantages" as discussed in Part II to refer to broader, higher-level policy argu-
ments; by contrast, the "litigation" perspective in Part III addresses the concrete legal me-
chanics of private wage and hour injunctions.
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Finally, Part IV discusses how injunctive relief responds to and highlights the
systemic nature of wage theft, and thus challenges the conception of employ-
ment law as being about and secured by individuals. The traditional dichotomy
between employment and labor law posits these two bodies of law as vindicating
individual and collective rights, respectively. Yet as Congress understood when
passing FLSA, wage theft occurs in a given labor market and jeopardizes stand-
ards for other workers and employers in that market. The Note proposes that
wage and hour protections therefore be viewed as collective in nature, collec-
tively secured or undermined. By potentially extending relief to all workers af-
fected by an employer's illegal practices of wage theft, injunctive relief may help
workers respond to wage theft on an appropriately systemic level.
I. FLSA'S ENFORCEMENT REGIME AS NEW DEAL VESTIGE
Because of the dearth of legislative history on the issue of FLSA injunctive
relief, this Part infers Congress's intention in enacting FLSA's enforcement re-
gime by juxtaposing the Act with broader regulatory understandings at the time
and with the evolution toward private enforcement in subsequent decades.68
This history suggests that FLSA's reservation of injunctive authority for DOL is
a vestige of New Deal-era regulatory attitudes presuming agency-centered en-
forcement. Extending injunctive relief to private actions by updating FLSA and
state laws, where applicable,6 9 would therefore move wage and hour law toward
the more recently dominant private-enforcement model.
A. The Post-196os Trend Toward Private Enforcement
The New Deal regulatory approach located enforcement primarily in a new
set of administrative agencies, which employed tools such as administrative ad-
judication and rulemaking alongside litigation. Beginning in the late 196os and
1970s, however, Congress turned to private litigation as a central means of stat-
68. Note that this Part is not attempting to interpret statutory meaning in this manner, as courts
have consistently held that private injunctive relief is not available under FLSA. See Powell v.
Florida, 132 F.3d 677, 678-79 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting agreement on this issue among lower
courts); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978). Rather, the question at issue is why Con-
gress chose this structure. This methodological approach is admittedly speculative to some
extent, given the lack of directly on-point legislative history.
69. Further research may be warranted into the seven state wage and hour statutes that provide
private injunctive relief, to discern how these fit into the historical arc of regulatory attitudes
discussed in this Part. See supra note 18 (listing these state provisions).
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utory enforcement. During that time, Congress enacted civil rights, environ-
mental, consumer protection, and other legislation that made private actions and
citizen suit provisions a centerpiece of regulation.70 Although private litigation
was a significant feature of U.S. regulatory enforcement since at least Recon-
struction, the 196os and 1970s legislation expanded the scope and frequency of
private enforcement litigation.7 ' This proliferation of private enforcement
marked a change in regulatory attitudes from the bureaucratic "enlightened ad-
ministration" of the New Deal era to what Robert Kagan calls "adversarial legal-
ism."72
Scholars have provided various explanations for this shift toward private en-
forcement. Some have argued that the relatively fragmented American govern-
ment, due to principles of federalism and low government spending, lacked the
capacity to meet postwar demands for socially transformative regulation, and
was therefore forced to enlist private parties as regulators to accomplish what it
could not independently.7 1 Other explanations for the growth of private enforce-
ment cite changes in social attitudes toward litigation - either negatively framed
as a rise in litigiousness, or positively framed as a rise in rights consciousness and
assertiveness. Still others claim that such enforcement simply reflects an in-
creased volume of commercial activity, resulting in more legal disputes.74 In one
now-dominant view, Sean Farhang explains the rise of "the litigation state" as
the product of divided party control of the legislature and executive, which ac-
celerated in the late 196os.71 On this view, conflict with the President drives Con-
gress to vest enforcement with private parties and courts rather than with exec-
utive officials who may be hostile to their goals, and who will be subject to the
oversight of different Congresses in the future.
70. FARHANG, supra note 11, at 5; ROBERT A. IAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERUCAN WAY
OF LAW 38-39 (2001).
71. FARHANG, supra note 11, at 12.
72. Melnick, supra note 64, at 82; see also KAGAN, supra note 70, at 3 (defining adversarial legalism
as "policymaking, policy implementation, and dispute resolution by means of lawyer-domi-
nated litigation").
73. See THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERs, LAwsUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS 6-7 (2002); KAGAN,supra note
70, at 34-44.
74. See FARHANG, supra note 11, at 13-16 (discussing these and other alternative hypotheses).
75. Id. at 5, 13; IAGAN, supra note 70, at 48; Farhang, supra note 64, at 51 (noting that divided
party control marked twenty-one percent of the period from 19oo to 1968, but eighty-one
percent of the subsequent thirty-two years).
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Farhang and others identify Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as mark-
ing a pivot among progressives to litigation-centered enforcement76 -a pivot
that is evident in Title VII's provision of private injunctive relief, in contrast to
FLSA. A central demand of civil rights groups pushing for Title VII's passage
was "a robust agency akin to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)," with
investigatory and cease-and-desist authority. Many conservatives feared a pro-
plaintiff bureaucracy and pushed the litigation-centered model that would even-
tually be enacted. Under that model, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) has investigation and mediation powers, but cannot adjudicate
claims, issue orders, or promulgate binding regulations. While the EEOC, in
partnership with federal courts, significantly shaped early Title VII jurispru-
dence through nonbinding guidance - and in 1972 gained the power to bring
litigation7 9 - a major driver of Title VII implementation was and would remain
private litigation.so
Civil rights groups' demand for an NLRB-style agency reflected both post-
New Deal regulatory attitudes and the recent history of employment discrimi-
nation law. In the two decades following World War II, nearly two dozen states
passed employment discrimination statutes." Although advocates and legisla-
tors advanced and debated different enforcement provisions, every law enacted
in this period vested enforcement in a fair-employment-practices commission
(FEPC) with authority to mediate disputes and issue cease-and-desist orders.82
Despite a meager enforcement record from even the most developed state
FEPC, 3 the FEPC statutes provided a readily available legislative model around
which various political groups coalesced on the state level. Moreover, "[t] he case
76. Farhang, supra note 64, at 53-68; accord ANTHONY S. CHEN, THE FIFTH FREEDOM: JOBS,
POLITICS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1941-1972, at 170-229 (2009); Rutherglen,
supra note 64, at 733.
77. CHEN, supra note 76, at 171. The NLRB's cease-and-desist authority is significantly limited,
however, by the agency's need to petition a court of appeals for enforcement. See Paul C.
Weiler, Promises To Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96
HARv. L. REV. 1769, 1796-97 (1983).
78. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) (noting that Congress "did not confer upon
the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations pursuant to [Title VII]" that carried
"the force of law," but that EEOC guidelines were entitled to some deference by courts).
79. See Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 671, 677 (2005).
80. Rutherglen, supra note 64, at 736-38.
81. David Freeman Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair Employment Law: Regulatory
Choice and the Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943-1972, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (2011).
82. Id. at 1073-74.
83. Id. at 1091-94.
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for aggressive administrative enforcement rested in part on the disappointing
experience of litigation under the Reconstruction civil rights acts," in which
courts quickly adopted restrictive legal interpretations that frustrated private en-
forcement.8 4 In addition, civil rights groups were hesitant about the use of liti-
gation because of the risk of jury nullification in the South." Those fears led
many to favor limiting courts' remedial power to exclusively equitable relief,
thereby avoiding Seventh Amendment jury requirements86 - a Title VII feature
that endured until 1991.
The compromise bill that Congress eventually passed crucially withdrew ad-
judicatory power over private employers from the EEOC, thereby placing pri-
mary responsibility for enforcement with private litigants while still requiring
them to exhaust administrative remedies by filing claims for potential mediation
before proceeding to court." Anthony Chen contends, "No single concession
more vividly symbolizes the cost of bipartisanship" than this "shift from an ad-
ministrative to court-based enforcement"; " [n] owhere is the price of Republican
support ... more concretely captured."9 Nevertheless, as Farhang writes, "If
civil rights liberals and private enforcement regimes were a forced marriage, they
soon fell in love and became inseparable."90 In an ironic twist, Title VII's litiga-
tion-centered model would prove central to its significant success over the com-
ing decades91 - a fact that civil rights groups soon noted.92
84. Rutherglen, supra note 64, at 737; see also GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW
OF SLAVERY: THE CONSTITUTION, COMMON LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866, at 93-
110 (2013) (outlining the cases that adopted restrictive interpretations of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866).
85. Rutherglen, supra note 64, at 738.
86. Id.
87. See Occhialino & Vail, supra note 79, at 686-87 (describing how the Civil Rights Act of 1991
instituted the right to a jury trial in a Title VII case, and the right to recover compensatory
and punitive damages in the case of intentional discrimination); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)
(2012) (noting that "any party may demand a trial by jury").
88. 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-5 (f) (1) (2012); see also Rutherglen, supra note 64, at 733 ("EEOC enforce-
ment stopped well short of adjudication of claims against private employers.").
89. CHEN, supra note 76, at 188-89.
go. Farhang, supra note 64, at 54.
91. See Melnick, supra note 64, at 97 ("The most important moral of the Title VI and VII stories
is that adversarial legalism can promote aggressive federal regulation of the private sector and
subnational governments."); see also Farhang, supra note 64, at 68 (describing how Tide VII
"became the liberal model for privatizing enforcement of the new social regulation"); Selmi,
supra note 64, at 1403-04 (demonstrating that private actions constitute the large majority of
Title VII litigation, and that they typically recover significantly more than agency actions).
92. Engstrom, supra note 81, at 1142.
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Whereas these accounts might suggest that the "New Deal religion" of ad-
ministrative enforcement was wholly dominant until the late 196os, David Free-
man Engstrom provides a useful corrective.9' In charting debates surrounding
state FEPC laws, Engstrom demonstrates that critiques of administrative en-
forcement were present by the late 1930s and 1940s, such that the American Civil
Liberties Union, National Lawyers Guild, and certain community-based civil
rights groups advocated for a private right of action in the New York statutes.94
The choice of the FEPC model cannot be explained, then, by a then-universal
preference for agency enforcement. Rather, Engstrom contends, established civil
rights groups preferred the FEPC model because it tended toward gradualism
and conciliation, and provided centralized control - as opposed to private litiga-
tion, which would allow more confrontational groups to push their own claims
directly in court.95 Engstrom shows that advocates and legislators advanced cri-
tiques of administrative enforcement before Congress's pivot in the 196os, alt-
hough private enforcement did not become dominant until this later period.96
By the late 196os-70s, a marked shift toward private enforcement was un-
derway. As political scientist R. Shep Melnick writes, "Within a decade of pas-
sage of the civil rights laws of the 196os, it was clear that the days of enlightened
administration had come and gone [and] [t]he era of ... adversarial legalism
was upon us." Progressive groups grew increasingly disillusioned with the New
Deal vision of regulation by expert agencies, which they criticized as timid, pro-
establishment, and subject to capture"- critiques reinforced by Richard Nixon's
election in 1968. These attitudes informed a wave of environmental, consumer
protection, and other laws in the late 196os and 1970s that made unprecedented
use of "citizen suit" and other private-enforcement mechanisms. This change in
statutory drafting, supplemented by judges' increased willingness to find im-
plied statutory rights of action, led in the late 196os to the volume of private
regulatory litigation outstripping that of public enforcement actions.9 9 The vol-
ume of private enforcement continued to grow under the Reagan Administration
despite significant Republican efforts at "litigation reform."00 Today, private en-
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1091-93.
95. Id. at 1075, 1114.
96. Id. at 1074, 1091-93.
97. Melnick, supra note 64, at 98.
98. Farhang, supra note 64, at 49-51.
99. FARHANG, supra note 11, at 12.
ioo. Farhang, supra note 64, at 68.
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forcement through litigation remains "a core dimension of the American regula-
tory state's infrastructural power"o0 and is "integral to the structure of the mod-
ern administrative state."102
In sum, the agency-centered regulatory approach of the New Deal produced
statutes such as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and FEPC laws that
allocated a minor enforcement role, if any, to private litigation. While that ap-
proach was already subject to criticism from civil rights advocates and legislators
by the late 1930s and 1940s, it remained sufficiently dominant in the 196os that
proponents of a robust federal employment discrimination statute overwhelm-
ingly favored an NLRA-style agency and disfavored private enforcement. In a
compromise that would ultimately prove fruitful for advocates, Title VII adopted
a relatively new enforcement model based on private litigation -which, like
many subsequent statutes, provided private injunctive relief- that proved more
transformative in its implementation than the relatively dismal record of FEPC
laws. Since the enactment of Title VII, Congress has turned significantly toward
private enforcement, enacting civil rights, environmental, consumer protection,
and other legislation that makes private actions and citizen suit provisions a cen-
terpiece of implementation.
B. FLSA's Private Enforcement Regime
In this context, it appears that when Congress passed FLSA in 1938, it simply
assumed a model of agency-centered enforcement. Labor advocates fiercely de-
bated FLSA's substantive provisions and enforcement mechanisms, leading to
abortive attempts at the statute's passage.0 3 Despite these debates, there is little
legislative history discussing the role of private enforcement, much less injunc-
tive relief. The absence of controversy around private enforcement makes sense:
even under Engstrom's account, the enactment of FLSA predated calls in the late
1930s and 1940s for increased private enforcement. Yet as Congress's subsequent
turn to private regulatory litigation illustrates, and as this Note discusses in Part
II, there are several policy advantages to a robust private enforcement regime.
The major debates surrounding FLSA did not concern private enforcement,
but rather the implementing agency's identity and powers. The American Fed-
eration of Labor (AFL) and newly founded Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO) were sharply divided over whether the Act should establish universal
101. Id.
102. Glover, supra note 28, at 1137.
103. Howard D. Samuel, Troubled Passage: The Labor Movement and the Fair Labor Standards Act,
MONTHLY LAB. REv., Dec. 20oo, at 32, 34-36.
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minimum standards (the AFL position) or industry-based wage boards (the
CIO position).104 William Green, AFL president, was also deeply suspicious of
the Act's potential interference with collective bargaining rights, which had re-
cently been secured in 1935 under the NLRA, stating in congressional hearings
"that he understood the legislation was merely an attempt to encourage collective
bargaining and as collective bargaining expanded, government control should
abandon the field."o FLSA's drafters were thus centrally concerned with the
scope of the Act's substantive provisions, as well as the structure of public en-
forcement and its relationship to the increasing number of workers engaged in
collective bargaining.
By contrast, there was little debate over private enforcement. While orga-
nized labor divided over whether injunction proceedings would be brought by
DOL (the CIO position) or the Department of Justice (the AFL position), nei-
ther organization seemed to contemplate private injunctive enforcement, nor did
they dispute having a private action as a supplementary mechanism to recover
unpaid wages.10 6 Both bills reported in the Senate0 7 and the House0 8 prohib-
ited representative actions by preventing workers from assigning their claims to
litigants other than the agency. Neither bill provided opt-out class actions. Yet
the provisions establishing representative actions and opt-out class actions,
104. Id. at 34-35.
105. John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS.
464, 468 (1939). This optimism about the expansion and centrality of collective bargaining is
understandable in 1938, as union density more than doubled in the two previous years, from
13-24% in 1936 to 26.56% in 1938. See Freeman, supra note 41, at 292 tbl.8A.2.
io6. Samuel, supra note 103, at 34-35.
107. S. 2475, 7 5th Cong. (1937) (as reported by Senate, July 8, 1937).
io8. H.R. 7200, 7 5th Cong. (1938) (as reported by House, Apr. 21, 1938).
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which were later repealed by the Portal-to-Portal Act, 0 9 appeared in the bill's
conference report without comment.1 0
The only discussion of such provisions in FLSA's legislative hearings appears
in the June 8, 1937 testimony of John M. Keating, a lawyer speaking on behalf of
millinery manufacturers and workers. Keating argued that "one employee or his
labor union should be permitted to bring a representative action for the benefit
of all employees similarly situated," which would "make the act semi-self-enforc-
ing" and serve as a "psychological weapon" against employers."' Keating also
appreciated the informational advantages of private enforcement, noting that
" [t] he employee working right in the factory is in a better position than the
board to institute suit," and that " [h] e could [bring suit] better than the Board,
because he was there."112 Notably, Keating confirmed that he intended to pro-
pose a legal and not an equitable action-in other words, a regime limited to
damages, not an injunction." Given the agency-centric regulatory environment
in which FLSA was passed, it is unsurprising that the private enforcement pro-
visions of the bill received little attention. Moreover, even Keating's testimony,
which appears to be the most sophisticated discussion of private enforcement at
the FLSA hearings, does not contemplate the possibility of private injunctive re-
lief.
iog. The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, 61 Stat. 84, responded to years of fierce
litigation over whether certain time spent traveling and preparing for work -such as time
spent passing from one mine portal to another- was compensable work time under FLSA and
other statutes. See Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The Origins of the Portal-to-Portal
Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 53 (1991). In particular, a nascent CIO brought a wave of portal
suits during and following World War II seeking to gain bargaining power against employers
and secure large recoveries. Id. at 56. This movement was strengthened when the Supreme
Court held in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 68o (1946), that preliminary work
activities performed entirely for the employer's benefit and subject to employer control con-
stituted work time under FLSA. A conservative Congress reacted to this "emergency" by pass-
ing the Portal-to-Portal Act in the same year it passed the Taft-Hartley Act-which signifi-
cantly gutted the NLRA, or at least codified existing legal precedent that did so. Pub. L. No.
8o-ioi, 61 Stat. 136 (1947); see Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-Labor Law?, 47
CATH. U. L. REV. 763 (1998) (reviewing the debate on the effect of Taft-Hartley). The Portal-
to-Portal Act significantly limited compensable time under FLSA. More significantly, how-
ever, the Act-perceiving a threat of unions and plaintiffs' lawyers stirring up litigation on
behalf of large numbers of workers - repealed FLSA's representative-action and opt-out class-
action provisions.
11o. H.R. RUP. No. 75-2738, at 11 (1938) (Conf. Rep.).
iii. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937: Joint Hearings on S. 2475 and H.R. 72oo Before the S. Comm.
on Educ. and Labor & the H. Comm. on Labor, 7 5th Cong. 457-62 (1937) [hereinafter 1937 Hear-
ings] (statement of John M. Keating).
112. Id. at 462-63.
113. Id. at 462.
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Apart from the changes in the Portal-to-Portal Act, the remedial structure of
FLSA has remained largely the same since enactment, despite periodic amend-
ments to raise the minimum wage and address issues such as gender equity.1 14
Sections 206 and 207 of the Act (originally sections 6 and 7) establish minimum-
wage and overtime protections, respectively." Section 211 requires employers to
keep certain records and empowers DOL to investigate and inspect those rec-
ords.1 16 Notably, this section also states, " [T]he Administrator [now called "the
Secretary"] shall bring all actions under section 217 of this title to restrain viola-
tions of this chapter.""' Section 216 establishes penalties: § 216(a) provides for
fines or imprisonment after prior FLSA convictions; § 216(b) provides employ-
ees a private right of action to recover for violations of §§ 216-217, plus "an addi-
tional equal amount as liquidated damages," attorney's fees, and costs." Section
16(b) originally allowed an employee or employees to bring a collective action
"for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situ-
ated," or a representative action through "an agent or representative to maintain
such action for and in behalf of all employees similarly situated.""' However, the
Portal-to-Portal Act removed the representative action provision and added an
opt-in requirement for collective actions. 120 While other areas of FLSA have re-
sponded to the changing character of the American workforce and economy, its
core remedial provisions have remained stagnant since the Portal-to-Portal Act
significantly curtailed private enforcement in 1947.
114. See Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56.
115. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (2012).
116. Id. S 211.
117. Id. 211(a). This section provides an exception to the Administrator's sole authority to bring
a § 217 action for injunctive relief, for actions arising under the child labor provisions of the
Act (§ 212). The exception results from the fact that the Chief of the Children's Bureau in DOL
was originally charged with making all investigations related to § 212, and, "subject to the
direction and control of the Attorney General, shall bring all actions under section [2]17." Id.
§ 212(b). When the Children's Bureau was transferred to the Social Security Administration
in 1946, § 212 was amended to read "The Secretary of Labor." 29 U.S.C. § 212(b) (1952). Sec-
tion 211 was not amended to reflect this change, and still states the Administrator "shall bring
all actions under section [2]17" except as provided in § 212, which now also refers to the Sec-
retary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (2012). The most natural way to read this vestigial distinc-
tion, given the statutory history, is that the "exception" for § 212 refers to the fact that inves-
tigations under that section, unlike under § 211, are "subject to the direction and control of
the Attorney General." Id. § 212(b).
11s. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1940).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1952). The opt-in language states, "No employee shall be a party plaintiff
to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such
consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought." Id.
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Despite § 217 generally providing jurisdiction for "injunction proceedings,"
5 211 bifurcates public and private enforcement, with DOL bearing primary en-
forcement responsibility under the Act.121 This division is illustrated in the 1977
Senate testimony of then-Secretary of Labor F. Ray Marshall and Solicitor of
Labor Carin Ann Clauss on a proposed bill to amend FLSA. Marshall proposed
a successful amendment o the Act to provide injunctive relief in private actions
under FLSA's anti-retaliation provision, such as to order reinstatement after a
retaliatory firing. In response to Marshall's proposal, the Committee Chairman
inquired about FLSA private injunctive relief generally:
THE CHAIRMAN. What action would be taken to get the employer to
change the wage? ... Is there any way to enjoin that rate, or get them to
pay the legal rate?
Ms. CLAUs5. There is no point of action.
THE CHAIRMAN. But under your proposal, is there?
Ms. CLAUsS. No, because we feel we have the resources to bring the in-
junction suit . . .. [Describing the specific problem of retaliation.]
THE CHAIRMAN. You will still be the sole enforcement agency in getting
the rate changed?
Ms. CLAUss. That is right. We are proposing no change there.
THE CHAIRMAN. Do you have the resources to handle that?
Ms. CLAUss. That is right. 122
The Solicitor of Labor tellingly understands injunctive relief as the sole
means for "getting the rate changed," rather than simply compensating workers
for violations. This distinction is startling: we would not say that private Title
VII litigants may obtain compensation for past harm, but are powerless to
change their employers' practices. Similarly, the Supreme Court has noted that
Congress in enacting the ADEA in 1967 "made plain its decision to follow a dif-
ferent course" from FLSA by providing private injunctive relief.123
Secretary Marshall's arguments in favor of immediate injunctive relief under
FLSA's anti-retaliation provision may be applied to prospective injunctions and
help to frame the following policy discussion. As Marshall testified, "the only
avenue open to a wrongfully discharged employee is to persuade the Department
121. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 211, 217 (2012).
122. 1977FLSA Hearings, supra note 66, at 16-17 (statement of Carin Ann Clauss, Solicitor of La-
bor).
123. Lorillardv. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978).
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of Labor to file suit."124 That arrangement "places a heavy burden on the Depart-
ment of Labor's resources" and "leaves the employee without a remedy in those
cases where the Department decides not to sue."125 By contrast, providing private
injunctive relief would ease the Agency's burden and better safeguard workers'
rights, since "if employers knew employees had this added right, it would deter
them from [violating] their rights under the act."1 2 6 Congress found Marshall's
arguments persuasive and extended injunctive relief to private actions under its
anti-retaliation provision in 1977.127 Marshall's insights were not, however, ap-
plied to FLSA's main provisions, and the Act's use of prospective injunctive relief
remained stuck in the agency-centered mold in which it was cast in 1938.
II. THE REGULATORY CASE FOR PRIVATE WAGE AND HOUR
INJUNCTIONS
This Part draws on recent private-enforcement literature to make the policy
case for the private wage and hour injunction. The absence of private injunctive
relief is not only, as the prior Part described, inconsistent with the historical
trend toward increased private enforcement, but also results in less effective en-
forcement. Although some of the private-enforcement literature has referenced
FLSA in broader discussions, none has addressed whether private injunctive re-
lief should be available. Drawing on this work, this Part argues that private par-
ties are better situated to pursue aggressive and consistent enforcement, that pri-
vate parties possess significant informational advantages over agencies, and that
expanded private enforcement would better empower workers. The Part then
addresses three potential objections to increased private enforcement: a lack of
democratic accountability as compared to public agencies; the danger of over-
burdening regulated parties; and the risk of abusive, frivolous litigation. Ulti-
mately, these concerns are misplaced in the context of the private wage and hour
injunction, and in any event are outweighed by its significant regulatory ad-
vantages.
124. 1977 FLSA Hearings, supra note 66, at 15-16 (statement of Hon. F. Ray Marshall, Secretary of
Labor).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 17.
127. See Pub. L. No. 95-151, 91 Stat. 1245, § lo(a) (1977) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to provide
"such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate ... including without limitation employ-
ment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages").
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A. Regulatory Advantages of Private Injunctive Relief
Extending injunctive relief to private wage and hour actions would result in
more aggressive and consistent enforcement, given that agency officials are sub-
ject to capture as well as to political pressure from Congresses and presidential
administrations that may be hostile to combatting wage theft. Private injunctive
relief may also harness the informational advantages of workers and their advo-
cates, especially community-embedded lawyers and advocates at workers cen-
ters, who remain close to and knowledgeable of employer noncompliance. Fi-
nally, enforcement of private injunctions may better empower workers than
agency actions by allowing workers to maintain greater control over the narra-
tive and direction of a private action.
1. More Aggressive and Consistent Enforcement
The overwhelming reason to provide private injunctive relief is that the cur-
rent enforcement regime has proven patently inadequate for ensuring that FLSA
provides the baseline standards Congress envisioned.128 Wage theft is rampant,
with FLSA and state equivalents "regularly and systematically violated" in low-
wage industries.129 The federal and state agencies tasked with enforcement are
dramatically under-resourced and have faced significant criticism.3 o The state
of wage and hour law is what J. Maria Glover calls a "public regulatory failure,"
characterized by "historical levels of significant underenforcement.""' Glover ar-
gues that under these circumstances, in addition to maintaining and improving
public enforcement, "courts, legislatures, and, when appropriate, administrative
agencies ... should appropriately calibrate private enforcement mechanisms to
enable private litigants to bring about regulation of harm left largely un-
addressed by the public regulatory body."132 Glover's argument, applied to wage
and hour law, suggests extending "the heavy artillery"' of injunctive relief to
private actions, in the hopes that this additional tool may lead to higher levels of
enforcement.
128. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
129. Bernhardt et al., supra note 19, at 2.
130. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
131. Glover, supra note 28, at 1203-04.
132. Id. at 1205.
133. Heitmann v. City of Chicago, 560 F.3d 642, 644 (7 th Cir. 2009).
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Private injunctive relief may also result in more aggressive enforcement han
its public-agency counterpart, given that private actors are not subject to con-
gressional oversight and the problem of agency capture. As Michael Selmi argues
in the housing and employment discrimination contexts, agency officials often
avoid controversial cases and are less aggressive in enforcement han private par-
ties because they fear congressional retribution or jeopardizing their careers in
government.13 4 Such political scrutiny is familiar to agencies regulating labor re-
lations, as Congress's long refusal to allow President Obama to fill an NLRB
quorum demonstrated."' Private enforcement may also be more aggressive be-
cause agency officials are "captured" - i.e., staffed from or beholden to the parties
they regulate - as dramatically illustrated by President Trump's unsuccessful La-
bor Secretary nomination of Hardee's CEO Andrew Puzder: an outspoken critic
of raises in the minimum wage who runs a company that has in recent years paid
out millions of dollars in overtime lawsuits.13 6 Because agency officials are sub-
ject to political oversight and potential capture, they may therefore be more
muted in their regulatory zeal than workers and private advocates.
Robust private remedies can also lead to more consistent enforcement over
time. Agencies fluctuate across Congresses and presidential administrations in
how zealously they enforce their statutes, and indeed at times appear outright
hostile to their own missions."' Moreover, changes in adjacent policy areas may
indirectly affect enforcement levels. For example, U.S. Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (ICE) has had a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
134. Selmi, supra note 64, at 1444-45.
135. See Rutherglen, supra note 64, at 755 (discussing the dangers of agency politicization with
reference to this example).
136. See Andy Puzder, Minimum Wage, Maximum Politics, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/andy-puzder-minimum-wage-maximum-politics-1412543682
[http://perma.cc/3MBE-LJ7F] (opposing a raise in the federal minimum wage from $7.25 to
$10.10); Julia Horowitz, Trump Taps Andrew Puzder, CEO of Hardee's and Carl's Jr., as Labor
Secretary, CNN MONEY (Dec. 9, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2o16/12/o8/news/economy
/andrew-puzder-trump-labor-secretary [http://perma.cc/D8TV-XR5P] (stating that CKE
Restaurants pent nine million dollars settling three overtime class actions in 2004, and an-
other twenty million dollars over eight years addressing overtime lawsuits in California
alone); Alan Rappeport, Andrew Puzder Withdraws from Consideration as Labor Secretary, N.Y.
TIMEs (Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/us/politics/andrew-puzder
-withdrew-labor-secretary.html [http://perma.cc/5BVJ-2FJ7] (noting Puzder's withdrawal
from consideration for Labor Secretary).
137. See, e.g., Scott Detrow, Scott Pruitt Confirmed To Lead Environmental Protection Agency, NAT'L
PUB. RADIo (Feb. 17, 2017, 1:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/2o17/02/17/515802629/scott
-pruitt-confirmed-to-lead-environmental-protection-agency [http://perma.cc/CN89
-YWKP] (noting that EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt describes himself in his official biog-
raphy as "a leading advocate against the EPA's activist agenda").
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with DOL since 1998 that prevents ICE from initiating immigration enforce-
ment where there is a pending DOL investigation, based on the understanding
that employers use such enforcement to exploit workers and undermine labor
protections.' There is already significant uncertainty about whether the Trump
Administration has or will continue to honor that policy, which could have a
significant chilling effect on immigrant workers reporting wage theft.3 9
When public enforcement wanes, a robust private enforcement regime en-
sures that some level of regulation remains in place. Farhang thus praises "the
autopilot and durable character of the private enforcement infrastructure," which
"had real consequences for presidential power" during the deregulatory era of
the Reagan Administration, "restricting the president's ability to curtail enforce-
ment."140 In an era when President Trump has proposed a twenty-one percent
cut to DOL's budget,14 1 democratizing the FLSA injunction becomes imperative.
Injunctive relief in private wage and hour cases would therefore increase work-
ers' ability to maintain FLSA enforcement during periods of executive ambiva-
lence or hostility to preventing wage theft.
2. Informational Advantages of Workers and Their Advocates
Private injunctive relief may also help to improve enforcement given the sig-
nificant informational advantages that workers and their advocates - especially
community-embedded workers centers-possess over DOL and state equiva-
lents. Glover suggests as a general principle that "all things being equal, enforce-
ment mechanisms should be entrusted and tailored to the needs of the regulator
138. Revised Memorandum of Understanding Between the Departments of Homeland Security and Labor
Concerning Enforcement Activities at Worksites, U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SECURITY & U.S. DEP'T
LAB. 2 (2011), http://www.dol.gov/asp/media/reports/DHS-DOL-MOU.pdf [http://perma
.cc/B4GH-SXW2]; see also Immigration and Labor Enforcement in the Workplace: The Revised
LaborAgency-DHS Memorandum of Understanding, NAT'LIMMIGR. L. CTR. ETAL. 1 (May2016),
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Fact-Sheet-Immigration-and-Labor-Enforcement
-Workplace.pdf [http://perma.cc/4R2Q-TSF5] (noting that the 2011 memorandum updated
an MOU that had been in place since 1998).
139. See Eric Levitz, Are Employers Using Trump's ICE Agents To Intimidate Workers?, N.Y.
MAG. (Aug. 4, 2017,5:30 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2o17/o8/are-employers
-using-trumps-ice-to -intimidate-workers.html [http://perma.cc/28LV-UEPC] (reporting
two cases in which ICE attended California labor dispute proceedings and apprehended un-
documented workers).
140. Farhang, supra note 64, at 68.
141. See Jonnelle Mate, Labor Dept. Cuts Target Job Training Programs for Seniors, Disadvantaged
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with superior command of information relevant to potential wrongdoing," a reg-
ulator who ideally also "ha [s] sufficient incentives to operationalize that infor-
mation through enforcement."142 Private parties generally have such advantages
where
(1) private individuals, as opposed to public regulators, are geograph-
ically close to the locus of the alleged harm, (2) the alleged wrongdoing
is fairly concrete and aimed directly at or knowingly suffered by private
individuals, or (3) the potential private-party regulator is integrated into
a market or other structured environment in a way that gives it first-hand
awareness of wrongdoing.14
In contrast, public regulators are preferable where "(1) a fairly large set of
data is needed for the illumination of potential wrongdoing, (2) comparative
analysis of that factual information is required or particularly helpful for the dis-
covery of potential wrongdoing, or (3) the information relevant to potential
wrongdoing is of a complex nature."144
Each of Glover's criteria indicates that private parties possess informational
advantages in the wage and hour context: (1) wage theft is experienced proxi-
mately by workers within a particular labor market who (2) suffer concrete
harms by being paid in violation of the law; furthermore, (3) a worker can de-
termine a wage and hour violation through firsthand knowledge and a simple
calculation, without comparative analysis or data aggregation. Indeed, Glover
identifies FLSA as a paradigmatic example where "employees, as opposed to
public regulators, generally possess informational advantages about wrongdo-
ing" since "employees protected by the FLSA will usually have the best infor-
mation regarding underpayment of wages or nonpayment of overtime."145
Glover concludes on this basis, along with the fact that DOL lacks the resources
to investigate even a significant fraction of covered employers, that "enforcement
mechanisms are better entrusted, as an informational matter, to private regula-
tors."
14 6
While Glover does not address injunctive relief, her argument applies to such
relief with even greater force. Workers and their advocates are better positioned
than agencies to monitor and enforce prospective injunctions, given their ongo-
ing connections to the employer and other affected workers. Whereas an agency
142. Glover, supra note 28, at 1177-78 (footnotes omitted).
143. Id. at 1180-81 (footnotes omitted).
144. Id. at 1180 (footnotes omitted).
145. Id. at 1183-84 (footnote omitted).
146. Id. at 1184.
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must make affirmative efforts to reinvestigate employers and reconnect with past
complainants to detect that an injunction has been violated, workers confront
these realities every day. As Keating remarked to Congress in 1937, "The em-
ployee working right in the factory is in a better position than the [agency] to
institute suit . . . because he was there."1 4 7 Unlike agencies, workers centers and
other community advocates often maintain deep relationships of trust with
plaintiffs, which are necessary to facilitate worker reporting. Moreover, workers
centers enjoy some of the informational benefits of both workers and agencies:
like workers, they are more proximate to experiences of wage theft than an
agency; like an agency, they have the capacity to document and process a large
volume of complaints, making them better at aggregating and processing such
information than workers, who lack this organizational platform. Workers and
their advocates are therefore better positioned than agencies to detect noncom-
pliance with a wage and hour injunction.
Moreover, as Glover observes, because the "FLSA systematically tends to
generate low-value claims" due to the low-income nature of those covered by the
statute, "mechanisms that facilitate the economics of claiming are required" to
promote enforcement by informationally superior private plaintiffs.148 Presently,
FLSA lacks such a mechanism. As Glover contends, "The fee-shifting mecha-
nism is unlikely to provide sufficient enforcement incentives for anyone other
than individuals possessing high-value claims" - a "rarity" in the wage and hour
context.1 49 Similarly, given its inability to extend relief to all workers affected,
FLSA's opt-in "collective action" provision fails to "align ... the scope of regula-
tion with the scope of harm." 0 Broad injunctive relief against an employer helps
solve this aggregation problem by subjecting an employer to an ongoing court
order, thereby supplying non-plaintiff employees with a ready forum to bring
noncompliance issues."' Private injunctive relief therefore helps plaintiffs har-
ness the informational advantages of workers and their advocates to secure em-
ployer compliance.
3. Worker Empowerment
A third reason to provide private wage and hour injunctions is that private
actions can afford workers greater control over and voice in litigation. Worker
147. 1937 Hearings, supra note iII, at 462-63 (statement of John M. Keating).
148. Glover, supra note 28, at 1184.
149. Id. at 1184-85 (footnote omitted).
150. Id.
151. See infra Section III.B.
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empowerment is an inherent good for those who view promoting workers' au-
tonomy and sense of self-determination as an important function of employ-
ment and labor law, particularly for groups who are subject to other forms of
social domination. Private litigation as a vehicle for worker empowerment is not,
however, self-evident: for example, Richard Stewart and Cass Sunstein wrote in
1982, "Litigation between private parties is an unlikely forum for achieving com-
munity self-determination. . . ."1 2 Yet, as the workers center movement of the
last thirty years has demonstrated, private litigation combined with organizing
and other advocacy can be a powerful tool for marginalized communities to as-
sert their workplace rights and to build their capacity to address other issues.
Drawing on critical race feminism, Coleman argues that private wage and
hour suits "provide [] opportunities for worker empowerment that are often
lacking in government cases."154 This occurs on a formal level in that "DOL and
the worker lack an attorney-client relationship," meaning that "many of the eth-
ical responsibilities that would attach and require the attorney to keep the client
informed and permit the worker to make decisions do not exist."' Less for-
mally, " [w] here state or federal government agencies investigate and negotiate
or litigate claims, the voices and narratives of the workers may be lost."1 5 6 As
Coleman explains, effective storytelling -which she argues is more possible in
private litigation, in which workers maintain greater control- can help deci-
sionmakers understand and retain workers' experiences, and may reveal legal
harms that were invisible under previously dominant narratives.1 17 In addition,
storytelling may "have a cathartic importance" for workers who "have felt their
exploitation was unavoidable, and their experiences were invisible."' Finally,
litigation can set the stage for further action, building solidarity among workers
with shared experiences.5 9 Private actions may therefore better empower work-
ers by affording them greater control over the direction of litigation and the nar-
ratives deployed.
152. Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv.
1193, 1295 (1982).
153. See sources cited supra note 55.
154. Coleman, supra note 32, at 425.
155. Id. at 426 (footnote omitted); see also Rutherglen, supra note 64, at 738-40 (discussing the
importance of individuals having control of civil rights litigation).
156. Coleman, supra note 32, at 427.
157. Id. at 414.
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One might add two observations to Coleman's analysis. First, private actions
may better empower workers to the extent that workers perceive private attor-
neys and organizers as part of their community, or at least more so than agency
officials. Whereas workers may feel a sense of dependency in returning to an
agency to enforce an injunction,16 0 they may feel a greater sense of agency and
autonomy in facilitating such enforcement through a workers center or commu-
nity lawyer, whose actions are identified more with the actions of the commu-
nity. Second, as compared to a retrospective damages action, after which em-
ployers frequently continue to engage in wage theft, an injunction may provide
workers with greater power to actually change how employers function. This
solidaristic goal of transforming employer practices - of ensuring that they and
other workers are treated better in the future - is frequently articulated by wage
and hour plaintiffs as a reason for their participating in litigation, in the face of
significant risks of employment or immigration retaliation.161 For reasons dis-
cussed in Part III, injunctive relief may significantly increase workers' ability to
achieve such structural change.162
B. Potential Objections to Extending Private Injunctive Relief
One might object to private wage and hour injunctions on the basis that pri-
vate enforcement is less democratically accountable than its agency counterpart.
Others might contend that private injunctions would overly burden employers,
or that increasing workers' potential recovery with the possibility of an injunc-
tion would encourage abusive, frivolous litigation. This Section responds to
these concerns in turn, concluding that they are largely misplaced in the specific
16o. See William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of
Community Organizations, 21OHIo N.U. L. REV. 455, 457-59 (1995) (sharing a community or-
ganizer's reflections that "[t]raditional lawyer advocacy creates dependency" and inhibits
community leadership development (quoting Interview with Ron Chisom, Nat'l Trainer,
People's Inst. for Survival & Beyond (Jan. 26, 1993))).
161. See Tamara Relis, "It's NotAbout the Money!": A Theory on Misconceptions ofPlaintiffs' Litigation
Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REv. 701, 702 (2007) (finding that the overwhelming majority of civil
plaintiffs report being motivated by nonmonetary issues, to which their attorneys are often
not sensitive); Sachs, supra note 43, at 2738-40 (describing how workers choose to take actions
that entail high risks of employer retaliation based on a "logic of reciprocity" rather than act-
ing as "self-interested wealth-maximizers" (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes
omitted)).
162. See infra Section III.B (describing how the litigation benefits of an injunction, including con-
tempt sanctions and a broad scope of relief, may better secure employer compliance than dam-
ages actions alone).
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context of wage and hour injunctions, and in any case, are far outweighed by the
above regulatory advantages.
1. Lack of Democratic Accountability
A first potential objection to extending injunctive relief to private actions is
that by doing so we undermine the agency's ability to use prosecutorial discre-
tion to shape enforcement. The agency's enforcement decisions, in contrast to
private actions, are democratically accountable through executive and congres-
sional oversight, and ultimately to the public through elections.163 On this view,
what advocates see as a future administration's abdication looks more like a dem-
ocratic decision to reduce enforcement: "one person's 'implementation slippage'
is another's safeguard against excesses of regulatory zeal."164 This objection pre-
sents two distinct concerns: first, that private actors might bring more enforce-
ment suits than Congress intended, and second, that private actors might bring
types of suits that Congress did not intend or envision.16s As with other objec-
tions, much of this criticism has been directed at qui tam statutes, which author-
ize private party enforcers to bring suit on behalf of the government and recover
statutory penalties or "bounties. "166
In response to this objection, one might challenge both the democratic na-
ture of the agency baseline against which private actions are measured, and the
supposedly undemocratic nature of private enforcement. To the extent that DOL
and other agencies are unintentionally underfunded and subject to capture,16 7
there are reasons to doubt that their enforcement decisions accurately reflect con-
gressional intent or public opinion. Delegating enforcement to private parties
may then in fact be democracy enhancing, by "returning power and participation
to the people."168 Rather than an individual, self-focused act, " [p] rivate enforce-
ment can be seen as a participatory activity which allows individuals and groups
163. J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Litigation, 78 N.C.
L. REv. 539, 610-11 (2000); Stephenson, supra note 64, at 119; Stewart & Sunstein, supra note
152, at 1294 (claiming that "the very origins of administrative agencies lay in dissatisfaction
with private litigation as an undemocratic mechanism for social choice and control").
164. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 152, at 1295.
165. Engstrom, supra note 64, at 638 (describing how private enforcers may "develop and press
novel applications of legal mandates that public enforcers . . . would forgo as inconsistent
with the original legislative design").
166. See Beck, supra note 163; David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement's Pathways: Lessons
from Qui Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913, 1964 (2014).
167. See supra Section II.A.i.
168. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 33 (2002).
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to compete over ... pluralistic understandings of the public interest."169 Barton
Thompson thus contends that private enforcement "promot[es] ... democratic
values" by "giv[ing] citizens a socially important means of directly participating
in and influencing the formulation and implementation of ... policy." 70 In re-
sponse to the concern about novel legal claims, Thompson notes that many pri-
vate enforcement innovations are later adopted by agencies, suggesting that pri-
vate enforcers are simply ahead of the government curve rather than far afield of
statutory authorization."'
The democratic argument for private enforcement is especially compelling
since victims of wage theft are disproportionately deprived of a political voice -
whether formally by virtue of being noncitizens, or de facto by virtue of being
low income. As several social scientists recently found, the views of low-income
constituents ordinarily have no appreciable effect on their political representa-
tives.172 For most victims of wage theft, who are low income, private actions rep-
resent a primary means of input into how the law is applied. Those participatory
benefits are more muted in agency enforcement actions, in which workers have
less control over whether and what claims are brought, the narrative and public-
ity surrounding the complaint, and the settlement process.1 7 1
The accountability objection is particularly misplaced given wage and hour
statutory frameworks and the nature of the private injunction. Federal and state
laws already allow private actions, so permitting private injunctions would not
allow new parties to bring claims, but simply make enforcement of existing
rights more efficacious. Therefore, adding injunctive relief would not funda-
mentally alter workers' ability to bring claims or push novel legal theories. More-
over, the issues litigated in the wage and hour context -for example, who qual-
ifies as an employer and an employee, how much a worker was paid-while
sometimes hotly contested, do not directly implicate conflicting values to the ex-
tent of other areas currently subject to private litigation and injunctive relief,
such as what constitutes discrimination or how to strike the proper balance be-
tween environmental considerations and industry concerns. Democratic critics
169. Kent Roach & Michael J. Trebilcock, Private Enforcement of Competition Laws, 34 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 461,474 (1996).
170. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovations of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 185, 188.
171. Id.
172. See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED
AGE 254, 260 (2008) (finding "the views of constituents in the bottom third of the income
distribution received no weight at all in the voting decisions of their senators," and thus "were
utterly irrelevant"); MARTIN GILENs, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 83 (2012).
173. See Coleman, supra note 32, at 425-28.
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of private enforcement herefore have less to fear in the wage and hour context
than in other arenas where accountability concerns are raised -particularly
where the issue is whether to extend a form of relief, and not whether to extend
private actions where they did not previously exist.
2. Overly Burdensome for Employers
A second potential objection is that private wage and hour injunctions would
overburden employers. This objection comes in both a pragmatic and a demo-
cratically inflected variant: (1) private enforcement's ocial costs would exceed
its benefits, for example, by preventing regulated entities from functioning; or
(2) private enforcement would be overly burdensome in a way not envisioned by
Congress or the agency in promulgating regulations,174 for instance, by pressing
technicalities not expected to be enforced. These concerns have found some trac-
tion in recent scholarship. Randy Beck explains the British abolition of qui tam
actions in 1951 partially in terms of "economically harmful prosecutions" and the
pursuit of "technical violations," and he urges reforms to the U.S. False Claims
Act (FCA) based on similar grounds.17 1 Joan Krause has similarly argued that
FCA qui tam claims against healthcare providers "are increasingly removed from
their factual and legal precursors," and can be counterproductive for patient
care.1 76 Providing private plaintiffs with the "heavy artillery" of wage and hour
injunctions, the objection goes, might do more damage than good, and may be
wielded against relatively minor, technical infractions.
Scholars defending private enforcement have responded that this critique is
overstated, and dependent on both the state of public enforcement and the ex-
isting harms of noncompliance. Engstrom, for example, argues that where pub-
lic enforcement is expensive and insufficient, "even overzealous private enforce-
ment efforts may minimize social loss relative to a world in which harmful
conduct is not controlled at all."177 Moreover, the strength of the burdensome
critique may depend on who is subject to the costs of overenforcement and un-
derenforcement, given that parties may be differently situated in their ability to
bear those costs. The social loss of vast underenforcement is currently borne by
174. See Stephenson, supra note 64, at 116 (arguing that agencies intentionally promulgate over-
broad regulations understanding that they retain enforcement discretion).
175. Beck, supra note 163, at 633, 627.
176. Joan H. Krause, "Promises to Keep": Health Care Providers and the Civil False Claims Act, 23
CARDOzOL. REV. 1363, 1368 (2002).
177. Engstrom, supra note 64, at 632.
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low-income and other disproportionately marginalized workers.1 78 Even if ex-
tending private injunctive relief were to result in some instances of overenforce-
ment, employers are relatively more affluent and in a better position to handle
such losses than workers who suffer from underenforcement. Any assessment of
potentially burdensome social costs of increased private enforcement must
therefore take into account the state of public enforcement, the existing costs of
underenforcement- which in the case of wage and hour law, are nothing short
of massive - and who bears the costs in either case.
Apart from this broader theoretical flaw, the employer-burden critique also
fails as an empirical matter. First, there is a nearly eighty-year track record of
DOL litigating prospective FLSA injunctions,1 79 occasionally aggressively, which
does not appear to have destroyed defendant businesses or prompted a critical
response. During that time, courts have repeatedly insisted that such injunctions
"are not excessively burdensome" because "[t] hey require no more than that the
defendants comply with the law."8 o Although there are reasons to believe that
the private enforcement of wage and hour injunctions could be more robust than
its agency equivalent,"' the fact remains that such injunctions impose no new
regulatory obligations, but instead merely provide courts with an additional set
of remedial tools to secure compliance from recalcitrant employers.
Second, insofar as a fundamental purpose of FLSA is to ensure fair competi-
tion and labor stability through minimum wage standards, increased (private)
enforcement of the Act may benefit regulated parties. FLSA's text and legislative
history evince these concerns on behalf of employers as well as workers.182 The
statute's "finding and declaration of policy" declares that substandard labor con-
ditions "constitute [1 an unfair method of competition in commerce," and recog-
178. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
179. See supra Section I.B.
18o. Wirtz v. Ocala Gas Co., 336 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cit. 1964); accord Mitchell v. Sw. Eng'g Co., 271
F.2d 4 27 , 432 (8th Cit. 1959); Reich v. IBP, Inc., Civ. A. No. 88-217 1-EEO, 1996 WL 445072, at
*1 (D. Kan. July 30, 1996).
181. See supra Section II.A.
182. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that businesses hould be able to bring FLSA actions
against their competitors. Wial, supra note 49, at 27-28. Such a complaint, however, would be
unlikely to succeed under current standards for implied private rights of action, particularly
given that Congress explicitly removed FLSA representative actions with the Portal-to-Portal
Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 5, 61 Stat. 84, 87 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(2012)).
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nizes that commerce in goods that are unfairly produced "spread[s] and perpet-
uate[s] such labor conditions among ... workers."' In reporting FLSA out of
committee, the House Committee on Labor opined:
No employer . .. need fear that he will be required by law to observe
wage and hour standards higher than those applicable to his competitors.
No employee ... need fear that the fair labor standards maintained by
his employer will be jeopardized by oppressive labor standards main-
tained by those with whom his employer competes.184
Then-Senator John F. Kennedy, upon introducing a 1961 amendment to
FLSA, similarly declared, "[I]t will serve as a source of protection to employers
who pay a decent wage and who must compete with employers who pay a sub-
standard wage.""'
These benefits of wage and hour enforcement apply most clearly to employ-
ers already complying, but they also arguably extend to employers committing
wage theft who are thus exposed to liability and potential labor unrest. While
the likelihood of workers asserting their rights under wage and hour law is woe-
fully low, the effect of a large verdict can be significant and sometimes fatal to an
employer. By smoothing out noncompliance in industries where wage theft is
endemic, greater enforcement might therefore decrease risk by creating condi-
tions where employers are not constantly violating the law and incurring poten-
tial liability.
Third, in contrast to certain FCA actions described by Beck and Krause,18 6
the conduct restrained by wage and hour injunctions does not involve "technical
violations" that are difficult to detect or far removed from Congress's statutory
aims. Although who constitutes a covered employee and employer is at times
183. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012); see also H.R. REP. No. 75-2182, at 7 (1938) (declaring that "the
maintenance of substandard labor conditions in a particular industry by a few employers nec-
essarily lowers the labor standards of the whole industry" and "results in a downward spiral
of wages" that "leads to labor disputes"); id. at 6-7 (declaring that under FLSA, "[n]o em-
ployee ... need fear that the fair labor standards maintained by his employer will be jeopard-
ized by oppressive labor standards maintained by those with whom his employer competes").
184. H.R. REP. No. 75-2182, at 6-7.
185. See S. REP. No. 87-145, at 2 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620, 1621.
186. See supra notes 175-176 and accompanying text.
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intensely disputed,1 17 FLSA's basic minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeep-
ing requirements are much more limited and straightforward than the various
statutes and regulations related to Medicare and Medicaid. As Kraus notes,
[T]he enormous quantity of information ... (not to mention the sheer
volume of the laws and regulations applicable to the Medicare program)
makes it highly unlikely that the corporate officer who signs the [Medi-
care] Cost Report will actually know whether the entity is in compliance
with each and every program requirement."'
This opens up Medicare and Medicaid providers to liability for inadvertent
omissions. By contrast, employers generally can, with some basic calculations,
know whether they are paying their workers the minimum wage and overtime,
even if they dispute the applicability of those provisions. Similarly, whereas the
FCA "is a classic example of an overinclusive statute," covering conduct that lacks
a specific intent to defraud and that does not result in actual damages,"9 FLSA
sets minimum standards that Congress clearly intended to be enforced such that
they function as an effective baseline. Concerns that enforcement of "technical
violations" may deviate from congressional intent or overburden employers are
simply misplaced given that FLSA has a limited amount of core provisions, vio-
lations of which are relatively easy for employers to detect.
Last, the burdensome critique is misplaced given certain statutory features
of FLSA. Public and private FLSA actions are mutually preclusive - that is, a
plaintiff cannot bring a separate action once DOL has filed suit.o90 That exclu-
sivity saves employers the cost and risk of redundant litigation,'9 which would
ensure that private injunctions are only issued where DOL has failed to act. Fur-
ther, the statute provides employers an absolute defense when acting "in good
faith in conformity with" FLSA administrative rulings or interpretations.19 2 This
187. See, e.g., Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (issuing a na-
tionwide injunction against a DOL regulation interpreting FLSA's executive, administrative,
and professional exemption to its overtime provision).
188. See Krause, supra note 176, at 1398.
189. Beck, supra note 163, at 628-29.
190. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) (stating that the right to bring and maintain a private action
"shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary of Labor").
191. See Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 285, 314-17
(2016) (arguing that mutually preclusive "redundant authority" regimes, where an agency
and private parties both have the authority to bring an action but cannot do so simultaneously,
"help [] with errors, resources, information, and agency costs while avoiding the direct costs
of truly redundant litigation").
192. 29 U.S.C. § 259 (2012).
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safe harbor moots the underlying thrust of concerns about technical violations,
by shielding from liability certain violations that are unclear based on existing
agency interpretations. These features allow DOL some control over private lit-
igation-insofar as DOL can decide to file first and thus bar private enforce-
ment - and afford employers some protection from overzealous enforcement.
3. Abusive Private Enforcers
A third and related objection is that the resulting expansion i  employer lia-
bility would encourage abusive plaintiffs to pursue frivolous claims and extort
defendants through "strike suits" -suits brought for the purpose of inducing
settlement, and with no intention to fully litigate." This objection is misplaced
since the remedy in question is injunctive relief and not money damages. While
plaintiffs might leverage the marginal increase in bargaining power from the
availability of a private injunction to secure an increased monetary settlement,
this is a far cry from the large sums that encourage qui tam bounty hunting.
Because the FCA provides a minimum $5,000 and maximum $1o,ooo penalty
for each statutory violation in addition to treble actual damages to the govern-
ment,194 and because a false statement may be repeated in thousands of claims,
each of which may arguably constitute a violation, an FCA qui tam action can
quickly amount to several million dollars.195 By contrast, under FLSA, only DOL
is allowed to recover civil penalties, and even then in more modest amounts and
for repeated or willful violations.196 Because liquidated damages are directly tied
to the amount of stolen wages, there is no danger that the potential recovery in
a private FLSA action will vastly outweigh the actual damages suffered through
civil penalties that are untethered to those damages. More fundamentally, this
objection ignores the fact that wage and hour laws are currently in a state of reg-
ulatory failure - wage theft is abundant, so plaintiffs' attorneys need not look far
to find meritorious claims.
193. Stephenson, supra note 64, at 115-16; see also Beck, supra note 163, at 581-82 (discussing frivo-
lous claims more broadly).
194. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012).
195. See Beck, supra note 163, at 630 n.476.
196. 29 U.S.C. § 216(e)(2) (2012).
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III. LITIGATION STRATEGY AND THE WAGE AND HOUR INJUNCTION
This Part illuminates the regulatory advantages described in Part II by dis-
cussing the litigation benefits and disadvantages of private wage and hour in-
junctions as they operate in a given case. Seven states presently allow private
injunctive relief. 197 However, the scant record of published opinions from these
laws reveals few employer-wide injunctions or subsequent contempt proceed-
ings. This Part therefore draws on DOL's § 217 enforcement o envision what the
mechanics of private injunctive relief might look like. The Part concludes by ob-
serving that robust use of private injunctions would challenge the conventional
view of employment law as concerned with securing "individual rights." Instead,
broad private injunctive relief relies upon and seeks to address the systemic na-
ture of wage theft, comporting with and furthering the structural understanding
of wage and hour protections that Congress instantiated in FLSA.
A. How 5 217 Injunctions Work
Although private wage and hour injunctions would likely differ somewhat
from agency-prosecuted injunctions,"' DOL's § 217 litigation nonetheless
demonstrates how private injunctive relief might function and the nature of the
relief private parties could obtain. DOL regularly seeks injunctive relief in FLSA
complaints and settlements."' Yet this practice has received almost no discus-
sion from commentators or the Agency itself, despite the impression from courts
and Congress that this relief is "of cardinal importance to the vitality of the Fair
Labor Standards Act,"2 00 and is responsible for changing employer practices.20 1
In deciding whether to issue a § 217 injunction in a DOL enforcement action,
courts typically look to an employer's past conduct, current conduct, and the
likelihood of future compliance, though evidence of current compliance is not
197. See sources cited supra note 18.
198. See supra Section II.A.
199. See, e.g., Hugler v. Foreclosure Connection, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-oo653-DAK, 2017 WL 2168202
(D. Utah May 8, 2017); Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., L.L.C., No. CIV. 16-621 JB/LF, 2017
WL 1709695 (D.N.M. May 2, 2017); Perez v. Fog River, LLC, No. 2:15 -cV- 500-PMW, 2017
WL 1194343 (D. Utah. Mar. 30,2017); Hugler v. Cathedral Buffet, Inc., CASE No. 5:15CV1 577 ,
2017 WL 1287422 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29,2017); Perez v. Five M's, No. 2:15cv176, 2017 WL 784204
(N.D. Ind. Mar. 1, 2017).
200. Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1965).
201. See 1977FLSA Hearings, supra note 66, at 16-17.
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normally sufficient to deny an injunction.202 Although the burden is on the
Agency to establish the need for an injunction, courts have routinely suggested
that because such injunctions are remedial and impose no new obligations, they
should be granted liberally.2 03 Indeed, although broad injunctions ordering de-
fendants to "obey the law" are often held to violate equitable principles of vague-
ness and the specificity requirement in Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,20 4 the Supreme Court has specifically approved § 217 injunctions or-
dering employers to obey FLSA's minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping
provisions20 - and § 217 injunctions are typically phrased in those terms.
For similar reasons, courts have also issued § 217 injunctions that are wide in
geographic scope, including company-wide injunctions.20 7 As one court ex-
plained, "It would frustrate the broad purposes of the FLSA in suits involving
large corporate defendants with extensive branch operations to require the Sec-
retary to investigate and prove violations in all or substantially all of the defend-
ant's branches to justify the issuance of a chain-wide injunction."2 08 Indeed, § 217
injunctions without geographical limitations are "frequently granted against
construction companies, whose work sites necessarily change from time to
202. See Metzler v. IBP, Inc., 127 F.3d 959, 964 (loth Cir. 1997); Brock v. Big Bear Mkt. No. 3, 825
F.2d 1381, 1383 (9 th Cir. 1987); Solis v. Int'l Detective & Protective Serv., Ltd., 819 F. Supp. 2d
740, 754 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
203. See Wirtz v. Ocala Gas Co., 336 F.2d 236, 24o (5th Cir. 1964); see also Dunlop v. Davis, 524 F.2d
1278, 1281 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[T]his court has not hesitated to reverse district courts for refusing
to enjoin future violations."); supra Section II.B.2 (describing the nonburdensome nature of
such injunctions).
204. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) (1) (B)-(C) (requiring that every injunction "state its terms spe-
cifically" and "describe in reasonable detail -and not by referring to the complaint or other
document- the act or acts restrained or required"); NLRB v. Express Publ'g Co., 312 U.S. 426,
435-36 (1941); Jake's, Ltd. v. City of Coates, 356 F.3d 896, 904 (8th Cir. 2004); Peregrine
Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, 89 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 1996).
205. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191-92 (1949).
2o6. See, e.g., Perez v. Gulf Coast Mgmt. Co., No. 14-00426-N, 2015 WL 895098, at *9-12 (S.D.
Ala. Mar. 3,2015) (enjoining defendants from violating FLSA's minimum wage, overtime, and
recordkeeping provisions).
207. See, e.g., Reich v. IBP, Inc., Civ.A. No. 88-217 1-EEO, 1996 WL 445072, at *1 (D. Kan. July 30,
1996) (issuing a company-wide injunction, rather than limiting it to the plants specified
throughout the suit); Marshall v. Nat'l Freight, Inc., No. 76-0385, 1979 WL 1977, at *13
(D.N.J. Sept. 6, 1979) (issuing an injunction against the defendant at each of its twenty-four
truck terminals).
2o8. Brennan v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 488 F.2d 443, 449-50 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881
(1974); see also IBP, Inc., 1996 WL 445072, at *1 (finding such a piecemeal approach "highly
inefficient and antithetical to the spirit of the FLSA").
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time."209 Courts have therefore not shied away from granting § 217 injunctions
that are expansive in geographic scope, based on the broad dictates of FLSA.
After an injunction is issued, the ultimate enforcement mechanism is a con-
tempt order from the court that issued the injunction. However, when a violation
occurs, the Agency may first put an employer on notice and attempt to negotiate
a settlement. If negotiations are unsuccessful, DOL may then file either a motion
for the defendant to show cause why they should not be held in contempt (a
contempt motion) or a new FLSA action. If DOL files a contempt motion and
the judge determines that it states a case for the employer's noncompliance, the
judge will order the defendant to show cause and schedule a contempt hear-
ing2 1 0 - a process significantly shorter than the typical litigation stages of a mo-
tion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment, and merits hearing.
In a contempt hearing, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant violated the injunction2 11 - that
is, that the defendant violated FLSA- though they need not demonstrate that
noncompliance was willful.2 12 After the plaintiff makes out this prima facie case
for contempt, the burden shifts to the employer to disprove liability or establish
a defense such as financial inability to comply.2 13 Courts have explained that "the
employer's burden is heavy," akin to the "plain[] and unmistakabl[e]" standard
for an employer claiming an exemption under FLSA.2 14 Together, these stream-
lined procedural steps provide a relatively simple and cost-effective process by
which DOL can sanction recalcitrant employers and secure payment of wages to
workers.
B. Litigation Benefits of Wage and Hour Injunctions
The advantages of injunctive relief are numerous and include both substan-
tive and procedural benefits. Contempt sanctions allow courts to quicldy and
flexibly escalate sanctions to induce employer compliance. Injunctions also allow
for a broad scope of relief, at the extreme a defendant-oriented injunction cov-
ering all of a defendant's employees, which achieves some benefits of aggregation
without an opt-out class device. The ability to quicldy return to the same judge
209. Wirtz v. Ocala Gas Co., 336 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 1964).
210. See 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.81 (3d ed. 2017).
211. See, e.g., Donovan v. Sovereign Sec., Ltd., 726 F.2d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Hodgson v.
Hotard, 436 F.2d 1110, 1115 (sth Cir. 1971)).
212. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949).
213. Sovereign Sec., Ltd., 726 F.2d at 59-60.
214. Hodgson v. Hotard, 436 F.2d 111o, 1115 (sth Cir. 1971) (quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc.,
361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)).
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means that injured workers can obtain relief more quickly and courts are not
burdened with needless preliminary procedures to address repeat violators. Fur-
ther, an injunction may effectively extend the statute of limitations back to the
time the injunction was entered, which may extend recovery for workers who
failed to report violations because they were unaware of their rights, lacked ac-
cess to an attorney, or feared employer retaliation. Finally, the ongoing sense of
court supervision from an injunction may exert pressure on employers to comply
with the law and empower workers in negotiations with employers.
Except for the broad scope of potential relief, none of these benefits applies
to opt-out class actions, meaning that private injunctive relief presents a number
of potentially unique benefits. Furthermore, although most wage and hour cases
settle, the existence of a statutory right to prospective injunctive relief may in-
crease employers' willingness to include such relief in a settlement, and may also
increase judges' willingness to enforce injunctions through contempt. Finally,
the statutory availability of injunctive relief may increase workers' bargaining
power generally, and might also be used to achieve other concessions from em-
ployers.
1. Contempt Sanctions and Other Equitable Relief
The clearest benefit of injunctive relief is contempt. The contempt power al-
lows courts to make workers whole by ordering employers to pay back stolen
wages, as well as to flexibly and quickly escalate sanctions against employers in
order to induce compliance. That is, the ability to escalate sanctions allows courts
to gauge an employer's internal cost-benefit analysis and to increase the costs of
non-compliance as necessary until they exceed its benefits.215
Courts may use civil contempt to order payment of back wages plus com-
pensatory interest. Further, courts may impose conditional "coercive" fines that
accumulate until a defendant comes into compliance with an order to pay wages,
although such fines must be paid to the court.2 16 For example, one North Caro-
lina district court found defendants in contempt for continuing to violate FLSA,
and ordered the defendant company to pay $1o,ooo and individual defendants
to each pay $1,ooo per day that they failed to pay the judgment awarded.217
While courts often only resort to coercive fines after significant noncompliance,
215. See Hallett, supra note 20, at 22 (describing the importance of shifting this cost-benefit analysis
in order to induce long-term compliance).
216. See, e.g., King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 65 F.3d 1o51, 1061-62 (2d Cir. 1995); Gen. Signal Corp. v.
Donallco, Inc., 787 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9 th Cir. 1986).
217. McLaughlin v. McGee Bros. Co., 681 F. Supp. 1117, 1140 (W.D.N.C. 1988).
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and damages do not go to workers, these fines allow courts to threaten employ-
ers with meaningful and escalating sanctions, which employers may avoid by
choosing to comply with the law.
Upon a finding of civil contempt, courts may also order an employer impris-
oned to induce compliance with a judgment, provided that the employer is re-
leased upon compliance2 18 - a power courts have used, if sparingly, in enforcing
§ 217 injunctions.2 1 9 Moreover, criminal contempt allows courts to impose non-
conditional fines and imprison recalcitrant employers for a non-conditional
term,220 though such sanctions trigger additional procedural protections.22 1 The
availability of contempt therefore introduces several heavier sanctions, which a
judge may apply flexibly to induce compliance. In addition, the specter of such
judgments may affect an employer's cost-benefit analysis and increase worker
bargaining power, reducing the probability of violations in the first place.
Injunctive relief also triggers courts' broader equitable powers to effectuate
their orders, by ordering relief beyond the statute.22 For example, courts might
impose additional reporting requirements, require employers to provide know-
your-rights trainings, or grant workplace access to organizers or DOL represent-
atives. As inspiration for such supplementary measures, workers and their advo-
cates might look to DOL consent decrees entered pursuant to § 217. For example,
a court could order an employer to allow organizers workplace access to conduct
know-your-rights trainings and private question-and-answer sessions - both of
which would be treated as compensable time - and to promote FLSA compliance
within trade and professional groups.223
218. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 829 (1994); Hicks ex rel. Feiock v.
Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1988).
219. See Sec'y of Labor v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 783 F. Supp. 405, 4o6 (W.D. Ark. 1991)
(noting a prior order to this effect).
220. Mitchell v. Fiore, 470 F.2d 1149, 1151, 1155 (3d Cir. 1972) (affirming a civil and criminal con-
tempt finding, including imprisonment for sixty days, or for thirty days if defendant paid the
"civil judgments and costs" within thirty days).
221. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632.
222. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685-87 (1978) (upholding a "comprehensive order to insure
against the risk of inadequate compliance," which extended beyond plaintiffs' established con-
stitutional rights).
223. See Perez v. Nat'l Consol. Couriers, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-03224, 2015 WL 6692238, at *6-8 (N.D.
Cal. July 15, 2015) (ordering such relief through a consent judgment).
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2. Broad Scope of Relief
Second, a private injunction could provide relief covering a broad set of
workers, achieving some benefits of aggregation in the absence of an opt-out
class action device or even a large set of plaintiffs. Building on § 217 case law,
workers could seek a defendant-oriented injunction covering, in the extreme, all
of a defendant's employees. While such an order would not provide damages
immediately to non-plaintiffs, the injunction would supply a vehicle for covered
but non-party workers to join as plaintiffs and file contempt motions through
the original plaintiffs' action, or to negotiate with employers with the possibility
of a contempt action as a bargaining chip. Under FLSA as elsewhere, courts will
also award compensatory contempt damages to third parties where doing so is
necessary to enforce an order,224 as it clearly would be where a defendant contin-
ues to violate wage and hour law against covered non-plaintiff workers.
An injunction may also partially alleviate - although certainly not solve - the
access-to-justice problem faced by many low-income FLSA plaintiffs. Such
plaintiffs often fail to initiate their own lawsuits because they lack the resources
to bring claims, are intimidated from doing so, or have "negative-value" claims
worth less than the transaction costs incurred to litigate them.2 25 The opt-in na-
ture of the FLSA "collective action" provision aggravates this problem: whereas
members of an opt-out plaintiff class may come forward after a successful judg-
ment or settlement to claim their rights, FLSA collective action plaintiffs must
put their names, time, and (if their attorneys are not working on a pro bono or
contingency basis) money into their case at a point when success is uncertain.
By contrast, where a standing injunction exists against an employer, workers
may come forward with more confidence about their potential success, and their
attorneys may be required to expend less time and resources to secure recov-
ery.226
The broad scope of FLSA's injunctive remedy is similarly evident in the flex-
ible applicability of injunctions to various corporate forms. In addition to issuing
injunctions with wide geographic breadth in terms of the workers protected,
224. Ahearn ex rel. NLRB v. Int'l Longshore & Warehouse Union, 721 F.3 d 1122, 1131 (9 th Cir. 2013)
(citing McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1949)).
225. Nantiya Ruan, What's Left To Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates that Bar Class
Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1118-19; see also Glover, supra
note 28, at 1184 (arguing that "FLSA systematically tends to generate low-value claims because
of the nature of its protected class").
226. See infra Section III.B.3.
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courts implementing § 217 have sometimes attached liability to affiliated or suc-
cessor corporate entities, which can diminish employers' ability to evade judg-
ments. As Lora Jo Foo writes:
Employers faced with large wage judgments often play the "shell
game"-that is, they close down one corporation and start up an-
other .... Former employees are unable to reach the assets of the new
corporation or company because of the legal fiction that the predecessor
and successor are separate legal entities.22 7
In Wirtz v. Ocala Gas Co., the defendants established three new corporations
to operate out-of-state facilities, yet a district court found the prior injunction
covered employees of the new corporations.2 28 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit sim-
ilarly interpreted the § 217 consent decree to cover a new corporate entity con-
trolled by the same family, including its operations at multiple new worksite lo-
cations.229Judges wielding equitable power might thus be less patient with "shell
games" and more willing and able to attach liability to affiliated corporate enti-
ties.
One might object to defendant-oriented injunctions on the basis that they
are overbroad when sought by individual plaintiffs, whose standing is arguably
narrower than that of DOL.230 Yet courts in the Title VII and ADEA contexts
frequently issue injunctions covering all of a defendant's employees, even with-
out a class.231 While little systematic guidance exists for courts on the appropri-
ate scope of injunctive relief,232 one principle from Supreme Court jurisprudence
is that "injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than
227. Foo, supra note So, at 2189.
228. See Wirtz v. Ocala Gas Co., 336 F.2d 236, 241 ( 5th Cir. 1964) (describing Tobin v. Frost-Arnett
Co., 34 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71, 220 (W.D. Tenn. 1958), ajf'd per curiam, 264 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.
1959)).
229. Id. at 242.
230. See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff--and Defendant-Oriented Injunc-
tions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
487 (2016).
231. See supra note I and accompanying text.
232. Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 CoLuM. L. REV. 2095, 2098 (2017).
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necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs."2 33 Defendant-oriented
FLSA injunctions are justified on this basis. As Congress recognized when it
passed FLSA, wage and hour protections address a systemic problem: because
workers and their employers compete in a labor market where labor costs affect
price, violations against one worker or set of workers threaten workers and em-
ployers in that market.234 "Complete relief " in this context thus means that the
defendant will neither steal the plaintiffs' wages nor undermine the plaintiffs'
enjoyment of wage and hour protections by stealing wages from other workers.
A defendant-oriented injunction is therefore necessary to provide complete relief
to the workers bringing suit, especially where it appears that an employer con-
sistently violates the law as a matter of policy or general practice.
This principle is easiest to grasp with regard to non-party workers at the
same workplace: for an employer to pay those workers in violation of wage and
hour law threatens the continued employment and working conditions of those
workers who have brought suit, whose labor would suddenly be more expensive
than their non-party counterparts. Congress's understanding of the systemic na-
ture of wage and hour protections justifies such relief even where plaintiffs no
longer work for an employer, since the former employer's maintenance of sub-
standard working conditions threatens plaintiffs' enjoyment of these protections
from other employers within the same labor market. Indeed, this principle might
even extend to other employers in the same labor market, whose business is
threatened by the defendant employer's maintenance of substandard working
conditions, although FLSA's private right of action refers specifically to workers
and would not likely support an action for unfair competition by other employ-
ers.
2 35
Broad private wage and hour injunctions are further justified because they
advance the congressionally determined public interest. The Supreme Court has
long held that where "matter [s] of public concern" are involved, even where the
government is not a party, " [c]ourts of equity may, and frequently do, go much
farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than
they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved."23 6 FLSA's
finding and declaration of policy makes clear that Congress understood the Act
233. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (considering the propriety of the district
court's certification of a nationwide class of certain elderly and disabled Social Security bene-
ficiaries, and concluding based on this principle that the lower court had not abused its dis-
cretion).
234. See supra note 183.
235. See supra note 182.
236. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937) (addressing a private labor
dispute under the Railway Labor Act).
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to forward the public interest in "[maintaining] ... the minimum standard of
living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers," as well
as for avoiding labor disputes.2 37 As the Fifth Circuit has also observed, § 217
"was designed and enacted as a necessary measure to assure the effective and
uniform compliance with and adherence to a public policy relating to wage
standards for labor, adopted in the National interest."2 38 Because FLSA is a re-
medial statute meant to further the public interest as described above - and not
merely to settle wholly private disputes - the public interest doctrine supports
broad private injunctive relief for wage theft, where such relief is available.
Under Supreme Court precedent, the nonburdensome nature of prospective
wage and hour injunctions also supports broad injunctive relief.239 Private FLSA
injunctions impose no new obligations on employers, but merely increase the
cost of noncompliance with existing statutory requirements. It is difficult to ar-
gue that a broad injunction along these lines would be "more burdensome to the
defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs."240
For similar reasons, a defendant-oriented injunction may be less troubling
from the perspective of non-plaintiff workers than such an injunction under Ti-
tle VII and the ADEA. That is, the content of a wage and hour injunction is -
apart from potential attendant prophylactic measures - existing statutory pro-
tections.2 41 By contrast, relief under Title VII and the ADEA might include re-
structuring of hiring and promotion practices, instituting certain complaint
237. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012).
238. Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 903 (5th Cir. 1965).
239. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979); see also supra Section II.B.2.
240. 442 U.S. at 702 (emphasis added).
241. Where private injunctive relief is available, another path to de facto aggregation is for a work-
ers center to seek injunctive relief based on organizational standing under Havens Realty Corp.
v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982), on the theory that it was injured by diverting resources
in response to the employer's violations. The injunction might cover all a defendant's employ-
ees, or a subset who are reasonably likely to be subject to such violations, on the understand-
ing that such employees could seek the workers center's help responding to the violations.
Unlike an "associational standing" claim under Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), such a claim would not be on behalf of workers, but the
organization itself. This could present other advantages, such as potentially circumventing
arbitration clauses binding employees but not workers centers. See Julius Getman & Dan Get-
man, Winning the ELSA Battle: How Corporations UseArbitration Clauses To AvoidJudges, Juries,
Plaintiffs, and Laws, 86 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 447 (2012). Such a claim faces a number of potential
challenges, including certain circuit precedent holding that litigation expenses cannot estab-
lish injury for standing under Havens. Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir.
1990). But see Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 905 (2d Cir. 1993). It
may also risk rendering workers centers "labor organizations" under NLRA section 2(5), with
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mechanisms, and so on. Given that the range of possible relief under FLSA is
much narrower, one might be less concerned that non-plaintiff workers do not
have a say in litigation resulting in a defendant-oriented injunction.
In sum, the broad scope of a private FLSA injunction helps to address the
aggregation problem posed by the absence of an opt-out class device, by cover-
ing non-party workers of the same employer and even across different worksites.
An existing injunction may also partially alleviate FLSA's access-to-justice prob-
lem, by allowing workers to come forward with more confidence about their po-
tential success, and requiring less time and fewer resources from attorneys seek-
ing to secure recovery. Finally, the flexibility of injunctive relief may allow courts
to attach liability to affiliated or successor corporate entities through which em-
ployers frequently attempt to evade judgments.
3. Returning to a Familiar and Potentially Sympathetic Judge
A third benefit of injunctive relief is that it allows plaintiffs to return to a
judge familiar with the parties and who previously held against the employer,
without relating the case to the previous action.24 2 The legal standard and pro-
cedure for relating a case to a previous action in federal court are generally set by
local rules, and can differ in significant respects from court to court.243 Regard-
less, relating a case takes time and effort and might not succeed. Returning to
the previous judge may increase the odds of success for potential litigation. It
may also lead to quicker relief due to a judge's familiarity with the circumstances,
and a shortened motions practice compared to a new civil action.244 In addition
to benefiting workers, this speed and efficiency serves general goals of judicial
economy.
several attendant consequences. See Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Coun-
sel, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. on Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (Redeye
Grill) (Nov. 30, 20o6) (concluding that a workers center was not a labor organization). A
defendant-oriented injunction involving individual worker plaintiffs may be less risky in that
regard because it does not place the workers center as a direct party seeking workplace-wide
reforms. However, the possibility of an organizational-standing wage-theft action is worth
further research given its potential benefits.
242. See supra Section III.A (describing the process for bringing a contempt motion).
243. Compare D.D.C. LCvR 40.5(c) (requiring that disputes over relatedness be decided by the
prior judge in the matter) with E.D.N.Y. R. 50.3.1(d) (requiring that the prior judge takes no
part in the relatedness decision).
244. See supra text accompanying note 210.
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4. Functionally Extending the Statute of Limitations
Fourth, a wage and hour injunction can effectively extend the statute of lim-
itations back to when the injunction was entered, allowing workers to recover
for additional pay periods. FLSA claims cover violations that occur within two
years before filing, or three years for willful violations.24 5 State law statutes of
limitations often cover similar periods, though some are longer.246 By contrast,
an injunction may remain in place for several years or even decades.2 47 Some
circuits have held that a contempt action may remedy violations for pay periods
from the date the injunction is entered- adding several potential years of recov-
ery. There is a circuit split on this issue, with the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
holding that the FLSA statute of limitations does not apply in a contempt action,
because such an action enforces an existing order against an employer and does
not institute a new FLSA action.2 48 By contrast, the Sixth Circuit has held that
FLSA § 255 requires that the statute of limitations run anew from when a con-
tempt action is brought.249
The majority approach of allowing recovery from the time an injunction is
issued accords better with the procedural continuity of a contempt action, the
purpose of providing sufficient notice to employers of potential claims, and the
broad remedial purpose of FLSA.2 5 0 Longstanding Supreme Court precedent
holds that the filing of a motion for contempt is to be treated as a continuation
245. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2012).
246. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-596 (2017) (covering two years); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
105/12(a) (2016) (covering three years); N.Y. LAB.LAw§ 198(1-d)(3) (McKinney2009) (cov-
ering six years).
247. See Fla. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc., v. Bush, 246 F.3d 1296, 1298 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Alt-
hough not all injunctions operate in perpetuity, a district court should enforce an injunction
until either the injunction expires by its terms or the court determines that the injunction
should be modified or dissolved." (quoting Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247-
49 (1991))).
248. Donovan v. Burgett Greenhouses, Inc., No. 83-2698, 1985 WL 153928, at *1-2 (1oth Cir. 1985);
Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9 th Cir. 1981); Wirtz v. Ocala Gas Co.,
336 F.2d 236, 243 (5th Cir. 1964).
249. Wirtz v. Chase, 40o F.2d 665, 668-70 (6th Cir. 1968).
250. Courts have routinely held that FLSA should be interpreted liberally in order to effectuate its
broad remedial purpose. See, e.g., Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2013); De
Ascensio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., soo F.3d 361, 373 (3d Cir. 2007); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry
Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 ( 9th Cit. 1979); Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139,
144 (6th Cit. 1977).
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of the same case rather than as a new action.25 1 As the Ninth Circuit explained,
the FLSA statute of limitations was adopted- like other statutes of limitations -
to protect defendants from incurring "wholly unexpected liabilities" that "would
bring about financial ruin."252 Yet " [o] nce a prospective injunction has been is-
sued against an employer, ... the employer is put on notice that future violations
will result in civil contempt proceedings to enforce the injunction."2 53 At that
point, a recalcitrant employer continues to violate the law at their own peril. In
addition, workers often endure wage theft and fail to come forward because they
do not know their rights under the law, cannot find an attorney, or fear employer
retaliation. Allowing recovery from the time an injunction is issued is thus con-
sistent with the procedural continuity of contempt, providing notice to employ-
ers, and the broad remedial purpose of FLSA. Under this majority approach,
private injunctions carry the possibility of functionally extending the statute of
limitations to the time they were entered. Where employers continue to flout
FLSA's obligations under an injunction, this would allow workers to potentially
recover several additional months or years of stolen wages.
5. Ongoing Court Monitoring and Pressure
Finally, injunctions may exert ongoing pressure against employers and em-
power workers to come forward by providing a sense of consistent, potentially
sympathetic judicial oversight. In addition to emboldening workers, the specter
of judicial oversight may increase workers' bargaining power in informal nego-
tiations that occur against the backdrop of a contempt action, making it less
likely that they will need to resort to the courts at all. This continuity may also
stitch together a sense of collective identity among workers who use the same
injunction to secure compliance, rather than file a disjunctive series of law-
suits.254 In the absence of a union, workers centers are an ideal organizational
vehicle to provide such continuity and oversight. Embedded in the communities
they serve, workers centers likely possess better information about employer
noncompliance than agencies or other legal organizations that lack an organizing
or membership base.255 Moreover, workers centers are more likely to maintain
251. Ocala Gas CO., 336 F.2d at 243 (first citing Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S.
448, 452 (1932); and then citing Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444-45
(1911)).
252. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d at 1375 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2012)).
253. Id.
254. See Sachs, supra note 43, at 2722-29 (discussing how employment statutes may serve as a frame
for workers' collective identity formation).
255. See supra Section II.A.2 (discussing information advantages and private enforcement).
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relationships with former plaintiffs, which are necessary to institute a contempt
proceeding based on the previous action.
C. Litigation Disadvantages of ContemptActions
Notwithstanding these advantages, contempt actions present three potential
downsides for plaintiffs as compared to bringing a new case: a heightened "clear
and convincing" evidentiary standard; the probable unavailability of liquidated
damages under FLSA; and the potential reticence of judges to hold defendants
in contempt. Note that these disadvantages only apply to a contempt action un-
der an existing injunction and not an original action seeking an injunction along-
side other relief, where there are no clear disadvantages to seeking an injunction.
After outlining these potential disadvantages, this Section offers three reasons to
believe they are not as significant as they initially appear. First, in a contempt
action, the court has already ruled against the employer, which might influence
the judge more than a formally heightened burden of proof. Second, the una-
vailability of liquidated damages is specific to FLSA and could be changed were
the statute amended to extend private injunctive relief, and in any case may be
offset in settlement negotiations by the availability of contempt sanctions. Fi-
nally, despite its perceived severity, many courts have held employers in con-
tempt of wage and hour injunctions, and in any event the perceived severity of
contempt may further incline employers to settle. Ultimately, regardless of these
merits and drawbacks, where a private injunction exists, workers retain the
choice to file a new action or a contempt action- options which may serve dif-
ferent goals of maximizing recovery or ensuring employer compliance and
speedy recovery, respectively.
The first obstacle plaintiffs face when bringing a contempt action is that they
must demonstrate that the defendant violated each element of the injunction-
that is, of FLSA- by "clear and convincing" evidence,256 whereas in a new wage
theft action the standard is a mere preponderance of the evidence. While signif-
icant, however, this heightened standard is not as burdensome as it first appears.
In any contempt action, the judge has previously held against the defendant - a
direct experience that may incline the judge in favor of plaintiffs more than a
formally heightened burden of proof would disincline them. Further, once a
plaintiff satisfies the standard for a prima facie case of contempt, the burden
shifts to the employer to demonstrate inability to comply, which courts have de-
scribed as a "heavy burden."257 This, too, helps to mitigate the higher evidentiary
standard for a contempt action. Therefore, while indeed a heightened burden,
256. Donovan v. Sovereign Sec., Ltd., 726 F.2d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
257. Id. at 59-60.
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the higher standard of proof for contempt is by no means prohibitive for plain-
tiffs.
Perhaps more significantly, several courts have held that liquidated damages
are unavailable in § 217 contempt proceedings - a serious impairment of FLSA's
remedial capacity.2 58 Because liquidated damages under FLSA are compensatory
rather than punitive,2 59 they are intended to compensate workers for the delay
in receiving their wages, factoring in "the reality that the retention of a work-
man's pay may well result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for esti-
mate other than by liquidated damages."2 60 In addition to affording compensa-
tion, the possibility of liquidated damages helps incentivize workers to come
forward and report violations. Moreover, liquidated damages are an important
sanction to deter employers from engaging in wage theft. Without such multi-
plier damages, the most that an employer will have to pay back is the bare
amount of wages owed, which in effect constitutes a free loan forcibly taken from
workers.261 For these reasons, the lack of liquidated damages constitutes a sig-
nificant disadvantage of contempt.
Multiple courts of appeals have held that liquidated damages are unavailable
under § 217 contempt actions, based on statutory structure as well as legislative
history. As one court explained:
The legislative history of the FLSA reveals that Congress intended to per-
mit recovery of liquidated damages only in suits under 16(b) and 16(c),
the two provisions expressly authorizing such damages .... The statu-
tory scheme gives the Secretary a choice: If he wants to recover liquidated
damages, he can sue under section 16(c), in which case the employer is
entitled to a jury trial on the back pay award; if the Secretary prefers not
258. See, e.g., Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 84o F.2d 1054, lo63 (2d Cir. 1988); Donovan v. Brown
Equip. & Serv. Tools, Inc., 666 F.2d 148, 156 (5th Cir. 1982).
259. Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945).
26o. Renfro v. City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529, 1540 (loth Cir. 1991) (quoting Laffey v. Nw. Air-
lines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429,463 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978)).
261. See Winning Wage justice: A Summary of Research on Wage and Hour Violations in the United
States, supra note 31, at 53 (stating that when DOL settlements fail to impose liquidated dam-
ages, "they give employers little incentive for future compliance" because "employers can ra-
tionally gamble that, if they are caught, the only cost they will incur for breaking the law is to
pay the wages they would have owed in the first place").
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to have a jury trial, he can sue for an injunction under section 17 and ob-
tain a back pay award as an equitable remedy incidental to the injunc-
tion.26
Although denying liquidated damages, courts have consistently held that
prejudgment interest is available in § 217 contempt actions2 63 and have awarded
DOL investigatory costs and attorney's fees.264 Nevertheless, the more signifi-
cant sum of liquidated damages is not available in such an action.
This restriction appears specific to FLSA and could be changed were FLSA
amended to provide private injunctive relief. Similarly, were a court to find in-
junctive relief available under a state statute, the court should not deny plaintiffs
any available multiplier damages unless that statute contains a similar re-
striction. Furthermore, even if liquidated damages were unavailable in private
contempt actions, potential contempt sanctions against the defendant may offset
the unavailability of liquidated damages in settlement negotiations. That is, in-
sofar as defendants settle based on their anticipated costs of trial, and not simply
based on a plaintiff's expected recovery, possible contempt sanctions may in-
crease the amount that employers are willing to offer in settlement, making up
to some extent for a lack of liquidated damages. Nevertheless, if FLSA were
amended to provide private injunctive relief but also extend § 217's restriction on
liquidated damages in contempt actions, or if courts found multiplier damages
unavailable in private contempt actions under state statutes, the decreased plain-
tiff recovery would present a significant disadvantage.
Finally, contempt's perceived severity may cause judges to be more reluctant
to hold employers in contempt than they would be to hold employers liable in a
normal civil action. This effect, like that of the "clear and convincing" standard,
is difficult to gauge. Yet the perceived severity of contempt need not be a draw-
back. Instead, it may incline defendants to settle earlier and for higher amounts.
Further, several courts have specifically opined that judges should not hesitate to
262. Brock, 84o F.2d at 1o63 (first citing S. REP. No. 87-145 at 39 (1961), as reprinted in 1961
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620, 1659; then citing Brown Equip. & Serv. Tools, Inc., 666 F.2d at 156; and
then citing E.E.O.C. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 615 F.2d 985, 991 (4th Cir. 1980)).
263. See, e.g., Donovan v. Sovereign Sec., Ltd., 726 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting an "over-
whelming weight of authority" on this point); Usery v. Associated Drugs, Inc., 538 F.2d 1191,
1194 (5th Cir. 1976) (explaining that this is "well established").
264. See, e.g., Herman v. Davis Acoustical Corp., 196 F.3d 3 54 , 357 (2d Cir. 1999); Reich v. Giaimo,
Civ. A. No. 85-2184(C)(5), 1993 WE 724662, at *1o (E.D. Mo. 1993).
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issue § 217 injunctions2 65 or to hold defendants in contempt.2 6 6 Judicial willing-
ness to issue FLSA injunctions and enforce them through contempt in DOL ac-
tions suggests that judges would be willing to do so in private wage and hour
actions too.
Ultimately, because an existing injunction does not force non-party workers
to file a contempt action if they think the remedy reduces their chance of success,
plaintiffs may file a new action if they believe the disadvantages of a contempt
action outweigh the benefits. In this way, an existing injunction simply expands
workers' strategic options and allows them to pursue different goals. Workers
may choose to seek contempt even where liquidated damages are unavailable if
they are more concerned about speed than with the volume of recovery. Given
their speed and possibility for escalation, contempt actions may better ensure
that employers change their policies, even if they do not maximize individual
recovery. Alternatively, if liquidated damages were unavailable in a contempt ac-
tion, workers prioritizing the amount of recovery- and willing to wait through
a longer motions process - might decide to file a new action. Similarly, if workers
are concerned that the perceived severity of contempt or other factors might
make their prospects on that claim dim, they could file a new action. In any case,
an existing private injunction would expand workers' choice of remedy.
IV. THE COLLECTIVE NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
The traditional dichotomy between employment and labor law, dominant in
the mid- to late-twentieth century, characterizes employment law-including
FLSA- as an "'individual rights' regime in which workplace standards are estab-
lished by statute and granted to individual workers, regardless of the extent of
their collective organization."2 67 By contrast, labor law, embodied in the NLRA
and similar statutes, provides protection for collective action and a framework
for collective bargaining that allows workers to define and enforce workplace
rights.2 68 Although both bodies of law vindicate worker rights, scholars have
265. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
266. In Hodgson v. A-1 Ambulance Service, Inc., the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court declining
in its discretion to order wages owed because this could cause the defendant ambulance ser-
vice to go out of business, negatively affecting the surrounding city. The Circuit rejected this
reasoning, holding that "the national policy involved in the Fair Labor Standards Act" did not
afford such discretion. 455 F.2d 372, 374 (8th Cir. 1972) (citing McComb v. Jacksonville Paper
Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949)); see also Usery v. Fisher, 565 F.2d 137, 139-40 (loth Cir. 1977) (gath-
ering similar cases).
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long identified tensions between the two269 and have argued that employment
law's minimal, poorly enforced protections provide a paltry substitute for collec-
tive bargaining agreements.2 70
The litigation dynamics of private wage and hour injunctions help illustrate
how injunctive relief would challenge the traditional view of employment law as
affording "rights and protections to employees on an individual - and individu-
ally enforceable -basis." 271 Although an individual plaintiff or plaintiffs must
first secure an injunction, injunctive relief would extend to non-plaintiff workers
on the understanding that wage theft is generally a matter of employer policy
rather than individualized malice, and that the violation of wage and hour pro-
tections "spread [s] and perpetuate [s] such labor conditions."2 72 The injunction
would provide a source of pressure on employers and, should violations con-
tinue, a litigation vehicle for other workers to obtain relief, ideally facilitated by
a workers center. Moreover, the court could also grant prophylactic relief, such
as know-your-rights trainings or orgamzer access, which extend benefits to
plaintiff and non-plaintiff workers alike.
In challenging the individualist conception of employment law, this Note
joins a line of scholarship seeking to unsettle the line between employment and
labor law.2 73 This literature has emerged amid the recognition of labor law's fail-
ure,274 due in no small part to the NLRA's remedial inadequacy, and often at-
tempts to envision a way forward that transcends the current failed regime. In
Employment Law as LaborLaw, for example, Ben Sachs identifies how- given the
NLRA's shortcomings - workers centers have used FLSA and Title VII's antire-
taliation protections to protect organizing aimed at substantive goals exceeding
these statutes.2 75 More recently, Kate Andrias has challenged the employ-
ment/labor law distinction in observing how the Fight For $15 campaign has
mobilized the political power of collective action and unions to raise wage and
hour standards.2 76 Whereas Sachs positions employment law mechanisms as a
269. Estlund, supra note 43, at 333; Sachs, supra note 43, at 2701-07.
270. Andrias, supra note 63, at 39-40.
271. James J. Brudney, Reflections on GroupAction and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1563,
1570 (1996).
272. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012).
273. See supra note 63.
274. Andrias, supra note 63, at 5-6 (describing the "collapse" of American unions and the failure of
the NLRA regime); Sachs, supra note 43, at 2685-86 (" [M]ost scholars believe that the NLRA
is a failed regime.").
275. Sachs, supra note 43, at 2730-31.
276. Andrias, supra note 63.
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means of protecting organizing, Andrias demonstrates how organizing can feed
back into employment law by building the political power necessary to alter sub-
stantive workplace protections: "Under the emerging model, employment law is
no longer just a collection of individual rights to be bestowed by the state. In-
stead, it is a collective project to be jointly determined and enforced by workers,
in conjunction with employers and the public."277 This "social bargaining" model
uses collective action and political advocacy to secure reforms that, like employ-
ment law, apply at the sectoral, industrial, and regional level, rather than at the
level of the individual firm.278
This Note takes that synergy yet further. Unlike Sachs, who observes how
employment law mechanisms can be used to protect organizing that secures sub-
stantive rights beyond those of employment law, this Note suggests that wage
and hour rights themselves should be understood -as Congress understood
them when it drafted FLSA- as necessarily collective. In a sense, then, Con-
gress's conception of these rights as collectively secured or undermined exceeded
the structure and efficacy of the enforcement mechanisms that FLSA put into
place, especially since the Portal-to-Portal Act further impaired aggregation by
eliminating representative actions and adding an opt-in requirement for collec-
tive actions. And whereas Andrias blurs the employment/labor law boundary by
exploring how organizing and political mobilization can improve employment
law protections and other workplace conditions, this Note has addressed how
those protections can be more effectively realized by changing the public-private
allocation of enforcement remedies. Private injunctive relief would not alter the
minimalist character of wage and hour protections, nor the fact that their content
is not self-determined by workers, but it could help make them genuine safe-
guards and transform the position of workers from "passive beneficiaries of the
government's protection" to more active enforcers of their rights.279
Moreover, contemplating injunctive relief in the wage and hour context
brings our attention to how wage theft is generally not an act of individualized
malice, as a retrospective damages remedial scheme treats it. Rather, as Congress
understood it, wage theft is a business model, which has a structural impact on
other market participants. The call for private equitable relief, as under Title VII
and the ADEA, is also a call for courts to take wage theft seriously in light of
FLSA's regulatory failure, and to assume a more muscular role in making the
law's protections real for the millions of workers - disproportionately low wage,
immigrants, people of color, and women -who lose billions of dollars each year
to wage theft.
277. Id. at 68.
278. Id. at 9-10.
279. Estlund, supra note 43, at 333.
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CONCLUSION
The Fight For $15 has started a national movement around substantially rais-
ing the minimum wage -a move that Americans overwhelmingly support.2 80
Any such legislation, if it intends to make these protections real for workers,
must confront the regulatory failure that is the current wage and hour enforce-
ment regime. This Note has contrasted the FLSA regime with other enforcement
models and argued that, as a matter of regulatory design and litigation strategy,
private injunctive relief would improve enforcement and advance worker rights.
These findings suggest that any state or national wage and hour legislation
should, inter alia, extend injunctive relief to private actions where it does not
exist, and that workers' advocates should more aggressively pursue such relief in
the seven states where it does exist.
28o. Majority Supports Increase in Federal Minimum Wage, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 22, 2015), http://
www.people-press.org/2015/12/22/as-election-year-nears-public-sees-mixed-economic
-picture/majority-supports-increase-in-federal-minimum-wage [http://perma.cc/2Q37
-7NPK] (reporting that seventy-three percent of respondents supported raising the federal
minimum wage); see also Issues and the 2o16 Campaign, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 18, 2016),
http://www.people-press.org/2o16/o8/18/5-issues-and-the-2o16 -campaign [http://perma
.cc/P7SS-V5VT] (reporting that fifty-two percent of respondents favored increasing the fed-
eral minimum wage to $15 an hour).
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